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Preface
It may seem unusual for an organisation like Brot für die 
Welt (Bread for the World) to be raising concerns about 
the international counterterrorism framework. In Ger-
many, civil society organisations (CSOs) do not seem to 
be affected by antiterrorism measures. However, as a 
development organisation we see more and more how 
anti-terrorism measures have an impact on the work of 
organisations which Brot für die Welt is partnering with.
For some years now, we have been observing that, 
throughout the world, civic engagement is getting riskier 
for activists, employees and volunteers working for asso-
ciations, NGOs and social movements. In addition to this 
personal threat, their organisations face systematic 
restrictions on their abilities to conduct their work. An 
increasing number of countries are establishing laws or 
adapting existing legal frameworks to make civic engage-
ment almost impossible. CSOs may have their registra-
tions withdrawn or bank accounts frozen. Bans on foreign 
financing are becoming increasingly common. Some 
countries have introduced complicated as well as time 
and resource consuming administrative processes. This 
thwarts the work of civil society organisations all over the 
world and limits their independence. For our partner 
organisations and for Brot für die Welt, the shrinking and 
closing of civil society space has very direct effects. Part-
ner organisations cannot work any more or are closed 
because activities they pursue become illegal, they lose 
their registration, or bank accounts are frozen. Senior 
staff members of partner organisations are criminalised, 
detained or threatened. These are just some examples of 
the challenges our partner organisations are facing.
In some contexts, it is argued that these measures 
are necessary because of terrorism threats and national 
security. However, the national legislation and regula-
tions linked to antiterrorism measures are not nationally 
isolated, but often linked and connected to international 
regulations. In fact, as the report shows, FATF (Finan-
cial Action Task Force) Recommendation 8 and FATF 
recommendations following evaluations add to these 
restrictions.
At Brot für die Welt we strongly believe that coun-
tries which silence independent voices, punish critical 
intervention and violate people’s freedom of speech, 
assembly and association, face grave difficulties in terms 
of their political and social development. A vibrant 
democracy that aims to fight poverty and to secure justice 
and peace needs a strong, independent civil society that 
is involved and critically accompanies political 
discussions and decisions. This is the only way of ensur-
ing that marginalised groups can gain a voice and that 
development reaches all, instead of merely benefiting the 
privileged. In particular, in times when human rights 
and civic engagement are increasingly under pressure, 
international organisations have to ensure that their rec-
ommendations, evaluations and decisions have no nega-
tive impact on human rights or civic space. They should 
not provide a justification for less democratic and repres-
sive governments to introduce restrictive laws and regu-
latory environments for civil society organisations.
The links between measures that fight financing of 
terrorism and civic space are not known widely. Many 
civil society organisations in various countries are 
already affected by these measures and many more will 
be in future. This report aims to inform civil society 
organisations and non-profit organisations (NPOs), but 
also political decision makers who are not familiar with 
anti-terrorism measures. Ben Hayes has been following 
anti-terrorism measures and their impacts on civil soci-
ety organisations for many years. We very much appreci-
ate that he could take the time and effort to write this 
report for us.
We hope that its conclusions and recommendations 
encourage debate and reform in Germany and in other 
countries, and within the intergovernmental organisa-
tions addressed by the report.
christine meissler
Policy Advisor Protection of Civil Society, 
Brot für die Welt
6Executive summary
This report examines the impact of international counter-
terrorism frameworks on the work of civil society organi-
sations. In particular, it explains the role of the Financial 
Action Task Force in setting international standards that 
affect the way in which civil society organisations are reg-
ulated by nation-states, their access to financial services, 
and their obligations to avoid proscribed organisations 
and other entities deemed to pose a ‘terrorism’ risk.
The introduction to the report frames these develop-
ments in the context of the ‘shrinking space’ of civil soci-
ety organisations. This narrative describes a new genera-
tion of restrictions and attacks on the legitimacy and 
actions of non-profits and social justice organisations.
Chapter two introduces the counterterrorism frame-
works that have most affected civil society. This includes 
UN Security Council measures on combating terrorism, 
the new international CVE (Countering Violent Extrem-
ism) agenda, the FATF’s counterterrorist financing 
requirements, and the EU’s development and implemen-
tation of these measures.
Chapter three examines the worldwide proliferation 
of restrictive civil society laws and their relationship to 
the FATF’s recommendations on the regulation of the 
non-profit sector. It draws on existing research showing 
how these have been used as a vehicle for the imposition 
of restrictive legislation across the globe, and augments 
this discourse with new evidence, examples and case 
studies. It also considers the prospects for reform, and 
the potential for the FATF to engage proactively in pre-
venting further restrictions.
Chapter four addresses a relatively newer phenome-
non: the financial exclusion of civil society organisations 
and resulting from the ‘due diligence’ obligations man-
dated by the FATF. Driven by ever-tighter demands on 
financial institutions to scrutinise their customers for 
links to terrorism, crime and corruption – and under-
scored by substantial fines for failures due diligence – 
banks and intermediaries are cutting ties with non-prof-
its and refusing to process ‘suspicious’ cross-border trans-
actions. This is a process that economists have termed 
‘de-risking’. While more research is needed, examples 
show how financial exclusion can fundamentally com-
promise the ability of affected non-profits to implement 
their programmes and fulfil their mandates.
Chapter five examines the impact of terrorist ‘black-
listing’ and sanctions regimes more widely on activities 
such as peacebuilding and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. It shows how the rigid interpretation of states’ 
obligations by the FATF is exacerbating what have 
become often intractable problems for conflict resolu-
tions organisations and NGOs working at close proxim-
ity to conflict zones or ‘suspect communities’.
The report draws three main conclusions. First, with-
out fundamental reform to the FATF’s non-profit sector 
recommendations, the proliferation and legitimisation of 
restrictive counterterrorism laws is likely to continue 
unabated. Second, the FATF is undermining interna-
tional law by directly promoting laws that contravene 
states’ human rights obligations, even where the draft 
laws have been criticised by UN mandate holders. Third, 
a rights-based approach to financial services in which the 
onus is on the banks and regulators to service non-profits 
and process transactions is the only way to address this 
particular problem of de-risking.
The report makes 11 recommendations to civil soci-
ety organisations, national and regional parliamentary 
committees, national governments and the FATF. It also 
encourages civil society organisations concerned about 
the developments described in this report to join the 
international coalition of organisations established to 
engage with the FATF and create and ‘enabling environ-
ment’ for civil society.
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Chapter 1
Introduction 
Counterterrorism has direct and indirect consequences 
for organisations that seek to empower poor and margin-
alised people by supporting democracy and human 
rights in developing countries. Repressive and authori-
tarian regimes have long made life difficult for interna-
tional development organisations pursuing this kind of 
agenda, and now international counterterrorism has 
engendered a new generation of restrictions on civil soci-
ety. These restrictions are related to a worldwide frame-
work that singles out non-profit organisations as being 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by ter-
rorist organisations, and demands remedial action to 
ensure that CSOs are adequately regulated and super-
vised by state authorities. Absent any meaningful protec-
tions for freedom of association and expression, these 
rules are making a significant contribution to a wider, 
global trend toward the restriction and closure of the 
‘political space’ in which CSOs operate.
By providing humanitarian assistance and protec-
tion to civilian populations and refugees, and supporting 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts, interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (INGOs) must 
also negotiate complex legal frameworks designed to 
mediate these conflicts, including international sanctions 
against designated terrorist organisations and national 
laws prohibiting ‘material support’ to them. Because of 
these laws, working in and around conflict zones now 
entails legal and political risks for relief and development 
organisations and their staff that did not exist in the 
1990s, when such organisations were relatively unencum-
bered “as partners in a shared agenda of democratization, 
participation and service delivery” (Howell 2010).
International counterterrorism rules and policies are 
being developed by well-known organisations like the UN 
and EU, but also in little known international venues like 
the Financial Action Task Force and the Global Coun-
ter-Terrorism Forum (an international consortium estab-
lished in 2011 by 29 countries and the European Union, 
its members include those countries most invested in the 
military and national security aspects of the war against 
terrorism). This has enabled states to reach cooperation 
agreements more quickly, but also means that the rules 
and regulations being instituted frequently lack any dem-
ocratic input, and in turn pay inadequate regard to funda-
mental rights. The decisions of these institutions can 
have a profound impact on the lives of ordinary people by 
transforming international law and shaping domestic 
policy (Kiai 2014a, para. 2). They also affect the ability of 
CSOs to carry out their mandates, to deliver assistance 
and protection according to the fundamental principles 
of humanitarian action where it is needed, and to support 
local civil society organisations facing state repression.
This report describes the development and imple-
mentation of major international counterterrorism 
frame works affecting international relief and develop-
ment organisations. It focuses on three trends in particu-
lar: (i) the ‘shrinking space’ for civil society and its activi-
ties more broadly; (ii) restrictions on access to the finan-
cial services needed to sustain these activities and actors; 
and (iii) the increasing difficulty in working in and 
around conflict zones.
Having tried to manage the consequences pragmati-
cally by adopting risk mitigation measures and program-
matic adjustments, sometimes at the expense of their 
mandates or partners on the ground, non-profits and 
CSOs are now coming together in greater numbers to 
demand international solutions to the common prob-
lems they face.
1.1  Shrinking and closing space 
for civil society
The ‘shrinking space’ metaphor has been widely embraced 
as a way of describing a new generation of restrictions and 
other factors affecting civil society’s ability to operate, 
though the level of abstraction is such that it often fails to 
capture the mechanics of what is actually happening on 
the ground, and why. Due to the level of limitations and 
restrictions in some contexts, observers started to speak of 
‘closing space’ for civil society. Under the rubric of ‘shrink-
ing space’ are at least six, often interrelated trends:
i. ‘Philanthropic protectionism’ encompasses a raft of 
constraints on the ability of CSOs to receive interna-
tional funding: This includes government vetting and 
approval of organisations in receipt of such funding, 
‘foreign agents’ laws stigmatising foreign-funded CSOs, 
and restrictions such as caps, state control of funds, 
limits on the activities that can be funded, the prohibi-
tion of specific donors, and taxation (cf. Rutzen 2015a).
ii. Domestic laws regulate the activities of non-profits 
more broadly: These may include government licensing 
or registration procedures that can prohibit or impede 
the formation of CSOs, impose onerous reporting 
8requirements, and institute intrusive state supervi-
sory powers and sanctions. While these regulations 
are often enacted in the name of increasing transpar-
ency and accountability in the non-profit sector, 
experience suggests that states, particularly those 
that do not respect human rights, are likely to intro-
duce or apply regulatory frameworks in a coercive or 
repressive manner (Jordan/van Tujil 2006).
iii. Policies and practices impose restrictions on the rights 
to freedom of assembly: As the UN Special Rapporteur 
on freedom of association has explained, in recent 
years, states across the world have responded to peace-
ful protest with violent clampdowns and a host of legal 
and practical restrictions (Kiai 2014b, para. 7; cf. also 
Kiai 2013; Kiai 2014a; INCLO 2013).
iv. Criminalization, stigmatisation and de-legitimisation 
of so-called ‘Human Rights Defenders’ (HRDs) – activ-
ists, journalists, critical academics and others in civil 
society (Protection International 2015): As the UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on HRDs stated following consulta-
tions in 111 countries across the world: “The evidence 
is oppressive… In very many countries the situation is 
getting worse by the day… A growing number of 
defenders point to backtracking in countries in which 
the law seems designed to criminalize them and to 
thwart what they do” (Forst 2015, para’s 35 & 41). While 
the repression of human rights defenders is synony-
mous with parts of South and Central America, Africa 
and Asia, we can also point, for example, to the harass-
ment and prosecution of people in Europe providing 
humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees as 
demonstrable of this trend (cf. Dearden 2016).
v. The restriction of freedom of expression online, 
directly through censorship and indirectly through 
‘mass surveillance’, which is used to target activists 
and civil society organisations (La Rue 2013);
vi. Attacks on civil society by religious conservatives, the 
far right or non-state actors;
vii. The exclusion of civil society organisations from the 
banking system, which is a relatively new but escalat-
ing phenomenon in the discourse on ‘shrinking space’.
Amongst others, the well-known social movement “Treat Action Campaign”, which has been successfully campaigning for the 
rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, faced opposition from HIV/AIDS denialists in the South African government.
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In its 2011 report, “Shrinking political space of civil 
society action”, the Act Alliance highlighted the negative 
attention given to organisations or actors who work in 
justice, human rights or natural resources related areas 
(Act Alliance 2011). According to data from the Interna-
tional Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), between 
2004 and 2010 more than 50 countries considered or 
enacted measures restricting civil society (Rutzen 2015b). 
This trend has markedly increased since the brutal 
repression that followed the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 
2011, with more than 90 laws constraining freedom of 
association or assembly proposed or enacted worldwide 
since 2012, according to ICNL (Rutzen 2015a, 3). Civicus, 
the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, expects to 
report substantial threats to core civil society freedoms of 
expression, association and peaceful assembly in more 
than 100 countries for the first time in its 2016 annual 
report (CIVICUS 2016). As the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace has stated, there can be little doubt 
that the “pushback is global” and the “restrictive meas-
ures against international support for democracy and 
rights are likely to persist for the foreseeable future” 
(Carothers/Brechenmacher 2014).
The reasons behind the “shrinking space” trends are 
complex. While government harassment of independent 
organisations is as old as the state system itself (Mendel-
son 2015), various theses have been put forward to explain 
its recent acceleration. One is the changing nature of 
development financing and the role of the state. Put sim-
ply, as states become less dependent on western aid, they 
become less open to influence by western governments, 
and have pushed-back accordingly (Green 2015). Wider 
public perceptions about the legitimacy and effective-
ness of NGOs and the motives of foreign donors often 
provide a strong degree of domestic support for restric-
tive measures in these countries (Sriskandarajah 2015). 
Another explanation is the changing nature of CSOs 
themselves, which is characterised, in part, by a shift in 
focus from service delivery to influencing policy, often 
under the banner of a ‘rights-based approach’ (Green 
2015). This is certainly the area in which the ‘shrinking of 
space’ appears most tangible. In the same vein, the 
restriction of freedom of expression online relates directly 
to the revolution in information and communication 
technologies, and the amplification of critical voices and 
citizen mobilisation it has facilitated. Finally, as this 
report attests, the relentless demand for stronger coun-
terterrorism and security policies, at both national and 
international level, has been increasingly associated with 
the overregulation of civil society and attempts to restrict 
its influence.
The result is an increasingly incoherent policy 
framework in which intergovernmental development 
bodies have called for increased action to address the 
problems of ‘fragile states’, including ‘radicalisation’ and 
‘extremism’ in war-torn and chronically impoverished 
countries, while the ‘political space’ needed to actually do 




How the international counterterrorism 
framework affects the work of  
INGOs and their partners on the ground
While there is nothing new about the international com-
munity working together to combat terrorism, the way in 
which policies are being developed and implemented has 
changed profoundly. Prior to 9/11, eleven intergovern-
mental conventions relating to the prevention of terrorist 
acts had been agreed by the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe:
 • Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed On Board Aircraft of 1963
 • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Sei-
zure of Aircraft of 1970
 • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971 (as 
amended by the 1988 Protocol)
 • Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons of 1973
 • International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages of 1979
 • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material of 1980
 • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 
(as amended by the 2005 Protocol)
 • Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on 
the Continental Shelf of 1988 (as amended by the 
2005 Protocol)
 • Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection of 1991
 • International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings of 1977
 • International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism of 1999
As intergovernmental acts, they were agreed by all 
signatories to those conventions and ratified by national 
legislatures. This type of decision-making characterised 
20th century international relations and maintained an 
important degree of national sovereignty, which was 
exercised by both government and parliament.
In more recent times, in a process that began in the 
1990s and was catalysed by 9/11, more permanent interna-
tional structures, with a mandate to coordinate, develop 
and implement counterterrorism policies, have eclipsed 
the previous intergovernmental order. Obscure interna-
tional bodies, populated with technocrats and ‘overseen’ 
by committees comprised of national government repre-
sentatives, have become policymakers in their own right, 
drafting international rules and regulations, and devising 
measures to ensure their implementation by nation states. 
This has had a detrimental impact on the capacity of 
national parliaments to scrutinise the measures their gov-
ernments are agreeing at international level.
In the absence of a central international body or 
authority with overall responsibility for counterterror-
ism, mandates are fragmented and diffused across a 
range of multilateral institutions and regional frame-
works. Consequently, national policy and practice is 
spread across an ever-growing body of legally binding 
instruments and non-legislative measures (the latter 
include so-called ‘soft law’ and policy instruments such 
as budget lines, guidelines, strategies and action plans). 
Taken together, this body of international legislation and 
policy is now intelligible only to expert observers. By way 
of background, this section of the report describes the key 
intergovernmental frameworks, actors and mechanisms 
in which counterterrorism policies are developed and 
implemented, and introduces some of the key impacts 
they are having on the activities of CSOs.
2.1  The United Nations
Within the United Nations alone there are said to be 
more than 30 different agencies and bodies working on 
counterterrorism-related issues (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2013). This includes the UN Security Council’s 
Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), the CTC Executive 
Directorate (CTED), Terrorism Sanctions Monitoring 
Committees, and the Counterterrorism Implementation 
Task Force (CTITF).
In terms of their impact, the UN Security Council’s 
Resolutions on counterterrorism and terrorist ‘blacklist-
ing’ are the most important measures affecting interna-
tional development activities. Resolution 1373 (United 
Nations 2001), adopted in the immediate aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks, has been described by legal experts as 
“the most sweeping sanctioning measures ever adopted 
by the Security Council” (Eckes 2009, 38). Mirroring key 
elements of President Bush’s Executive Order 13224 (EO 
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13224 expanded the USA’s existing terrorist blacklisting 
regime by obliging financial institutions to freeze the 
assets of any individual or organisation designated by the 
Secretaries of State or Treasury, and criminalising the 
provision of any financial or ‘material support’ to those 
so designated), and the USA’s PATRIOT Act (The 
PATRIOT Act increased existing criminal penalties for 
knowingly or intentionally providing material support or 
resources for terrorism), the Resolution requires all states 
to introduce laws to criminalise, prevent and disrupt sup-
port for terrorism and to freeze the funds of those who 
commit terrorist acts and those associated with them 
(S/RES/1373, para. 1c). In the absence of a commonly 
agreed definition of terrorism, states implementing the 
Resolution were left free to decide who the ‘terrorists’ are 
on the basis of their national interest. At a stroke, long-
standing armed conflicts between states and non-state 
actors were recast into domestic ‘wars on terror’, under-
mining legitimate struggles for self-determination.
As the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism 
and Human Rights has noted, overly broad definitions of 
‘terrorism’ have been used “to target civil society, silence 
human rights defenders, bloggers and journalists, and 
criminalize peaceful activities in defence of minority, 
religious, labour and political rights” (Emmerson 2015b, 
6). In the USA, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 2006 
has criminalised non-violent activism against animal 
businesses and elevated minor offences such as vandal-
ism and civil disobedience to a federal crime of terrorism 
(Center for Constitutional Rights, Blum v. Holder). 
Together with a series of Royal Decrees, Saudi Arabia’s 
2014 terrorism law criminalised virtually all dissident 
thought or expression (Human Rights Watch 2014). In 
the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, 
dozens of people were arrested and prosecuted under laws 
prohibiting the ‘glorification’ of terrorism – for things they 
said on social media (Greenwald 2016). In 2015, the Ken-
yan government designated two leading human rights 
organisations as ‘terrorist’ without prior notice under new 
counterterrorism provisions, freezing their bank accounts 
(Human Rights Watch 2015a). In 2016, Pakistan used 
anti-terrorism laws against farmers in a land rights pro-
test (Human Rights Watch 2016a). Brazil’s new anti-ter-
rorism law defines terrorism as motivated by “political 
extremism”, a term critics fear will be used to target pro-
testors and social movements (Human Rights Watch 
2015b). The latest proposed EU counterterrorism Direc-
tive, which is currently being fast-tracked through the 
EU’s legislative process, is described by the ‘Meijer’s Com-
mittee’, a standing committee of legal experts on EU 
Delegates at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations
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criminal law, as containing a definition of terrorism “so 
broad” that “discussions of possible justifications for vio-
lent resistance in exceptional circumstances are also 
criminalised” (Standing Committee of Experts on Inter-
national Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law 2016, 
para. 11). In 2010, the UN Counterterrorism Committee 
reported “continuing concern” with “the definition of ter-
rorist offences and related concepts (such as support and 
assistance) contained in criminal legislation in some 
States [which] provide the basis for the imposition of 
criminal sanctions and preventive measures.” The 
absence of an agreed definition of terrorism at the inter-
national level has left a void which has been filled by 
overly broad and vague definitions which, according to 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism, “violate 
the principle of legality” (Emmerson 2015b, para. 15).
At the heart of UN Resolution 1373 is the require-
ment that states prohibit making funds (including finan-
cial assets, services and economic resources) available for 
the benefit of persons or entities that commit terrorist 
acts, either directly or indirectly. What is problematic is 
the conceptualisation of ‘indirect’ or ‘material support’ 
(Mackintosh/Duplat 2013), under which persons or 
organisations working at close proximity to designated 
terrorist organisations could be criminalised for actions 
occurring in the course of humanitarian or development 
activities. The risk of association with ‘terrorist’ organisa-
tions has at times hampered the delivery of aid and had a 
broader chilling effect on development and humanitar-
ian organisations working in the areas of conflict resolu-
tion, peacebuilding and the protection of civilian popula-
tions in conflict zones. There are now more than 400 
sanctions lists worldwide, and steering clear of the indi-
viduals and organisation named on those lists has 
become an onerous undertaking that for some INGOs 
now incurs substantial operating costs. The UN, EU and 
many nation-states maintain country-specific sanctions 
regimes as well as dedicated lists of members and sup-
porters of alleged terrorist groups. The most important 
UN terrorist list was established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1267 (United Nations 1999), which 
first targeted Osama Bin Laden and his associates in 
1999. After 9/11 it was amended to target terrorist net-
works worldwide but was still known as the “Al-Qaida 
Sanctions List”. Today, following a series of new UN Secu-
rity Council Resolutions on ISIS, it is known as the “ISIL 
(Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List” (see in particular 
United Nations 2014, United Nations 2015a and 2015c). 
The impact of these Resolutions and terrorist blacklisting 
more widely is discussed in section 5 of this report.
The UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy
The period immediately after 9/11 was characterised by 
punitive international measures designed by the USA 
and its allies to enlist the cooperation of all UN signato-
ries in counterterrorism efforts. By 2006 there was wide-
spread concern at UN level – not least on the part of the 
G77 group of developing countries and the human rights 
community – about the trajectory of the US-led ‘war on 
terror’, the failure to take the root causes of terrorism into 
account, and the impact of counterterrorism measures 
on democracy and fundamental rights. These issues 
were duly addressed in the Global Counterterrorism 
Strategy (United Nations 2006), which was unanimously 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006 as part of a 
concerted effort to increase the legitimacy and coherence 
of the UN’s counterterrorism efforts. The Strategy, which 
was reaffirmed by the UN in 2010, addressed four pillars: 
(i) tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of ter-
rorism; (ii) preventing and combating terrorism; (iii) 
building national and UN capacity to do so; and (iv) 
Initiatives advocating for transparency and anticorruption 
are under pressure in more and more countries.
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ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
As  the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism 
and Human Rights observed in February 2016: “Unsur-
prisingly”, pillars (i) and (iv) “have attracted the least 
attention and remain relatively unimplemented com-
pared to the more operational and security focussed Pil-
lars II and III” (Emmerson 2016, para. 48).
So while the UN’s global strategy provided a norma-
tive framework that better reflected the UN’s values and 
principles, the role of ‘counterterrorism’ in the intracta-
ble conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa has 
continued to divide its membership, with the dominant 
mandate of the 15-member UN Security Council failing 
to command worldwide legitimacy. Moreover, the failure 
to develop an effective UN counterterrorism capability 
beyond the rigid international terrorist blacklisting sys-
tem has placed limits on the UN’s overall capacity and 
marginalised key UN entities. As the Center on Global 
Counterterrorism Cooperation noted ahead of the 2010 
UN counterterrorism review, the global strategy’s poten-
tial to “provide for collaborative, holistic counterterror-
ism efforts is either unknown or largely overlooked 
beyond New York, Geneva, and Vienna” (Cockayne/
Miller/Ipe 2010). Subsequently, the root causes and fun-
damental rights-based approaches that human rights 
organisations and INGOs have supported have devel-
oped in silos, in the form of ad hoc UN Security Council 
resolutions on issues such as the role of women and 
youth in peace and security, and critical reports from UN 
Special Rapporteurs working under the auspices of the 
UN Human Rights Council (see in particular United 
Nations 2000, United Nations 2015b and 2015c).
From counterterrorism to countering 
 violent extremism
More recently, following the establishment of the so-called 
‘Islamic State’ in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the focus of coun-
terterrorism has been widened significantly to encompass 
the countering or prevention of violent extremism (CVE/
PVE). In September 2014, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2178 to address the threat posed by ‘foreign 
fighters’ – people travelling to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS or 
any one of the scores of armed groups involved in the 
wider regional conflict. The Resolution was described by 
a former UN Special Rapporteur as “a huge backlash in 
the UN counterterrorism regime, comparable to Security 
Council Resolution (SCR) 1373,” which “wipes out the 
piecemeal progress made over 13 long years in introduc-
ing protections of human rights and the rule of law into 
the highly problematic manner in which the Security 
Council exercises its supranational powers” (Scheinin 
2014). The current UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-
terrorism has warned that in the absence of definitions as 
to what is meant by ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’, the 
Resolution paves the way for “Governments to use the res-
olution to justify repressive measures against political dis-
senters with the apparent endorsement of the Security 
Council” (Emmerson 2015a, para. 42).
In January 2016, the UN Secretary-General issued 
his own Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 
containing more than 70 recommendations for national, 
regional and international action (United Nations 2015e). 
Echoing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
adopted a decade earlier, it suggests that the creation of 
open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, based 
on full respect for human rights and with economic 
opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and 
meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the 
most promising strategy for rendering it unattractive 
(United Nations 2015e, para. 7). The plan, which was 
drafted by the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation 
Task Force, also draws on Security Council Resolutions 
on the role of women and youth in peace and security. As 
with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy it effectively 
replaces, the challenge is to bridge the significant gap 
between the UN’s holistic aspirations and the ‘hard secu-
rity’ agenda prioritised by those states most invested in 
the ‘war on terror’. The counter-extremism agenda also 
poses a renewed challenge in terms of human rights pro-
tection, due to the widened scope for criminalising 
‘extremist’ groups and individuals. Like many human 
rights organisations, Amnesty International has warned 
that abusive regimes could take advantage of ‘CVE-ma-
nia’ and use international funding to violate human 
rights in the absence of appropriate safeguards (Hawkins 
2015; cf. also UN HRC 2015).
2.2  The Financial Action 
Task Force
One of the most important bodies outside the UN is the 
little-known international Financial Action Task Force, 
which has a mandate to ensure the integrity of the global 
financial system by devising anti-money laundering 
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(AML) and terrorist financing rules. The FATF’s coun-
terterrorism mandate is a product of post-9/11 thinking, 
which was dominated by an obsession with preventing 
terrorist financing and imposed a new orthodoxy in 
which “stopping terrorism starts with stopping the 
money” (Goede 2012, p. 4). This has had a tremendous 
impact on the financial sector, to which responsibility 
for policing the users of the financial system has effec-
tively been outsourced.
The decision to establish the FATF was taken in 1989 
at a summit of the Group of Seven (G7) leading industri-
alised nations. The G7 demanded concerted interna-
tional action to counter drug trafficking and the launder-
ing of its proceeds (G7 1989, para. 52). The newly estab-
lished Task Force, which along with the G7 states also 
comprised the European Commission and eight other 
countries, was asked to assess international efforts to 
combat money laundering and to consider additional 
preventive measures (ibid., para. 53). Nine months later, 
in April 1990, the 130 FATF delegates delivered 40 
wide-ranging recommendations encompassing legal, 
regulatory and operational measures (FATF 1990, FATF 
2012). In October 2001 the FATF issued ‘Eight Special 
Recommendations’ on terrorist financing. The 40 money 
laundering recommendations were revised in June 2003 
and in October 2004 the FATF added a Ninth Special 
Recommendation on terrorist financing. In February 
2012, the FATF integrated the 40 money laundering and 
nine terrorist financing standards into a single set of 40 
recommendations. In October 2015, the recommenda-
tions were subject to further, minor amendment (see 
FATF 2012, updated October 2015).
Countering the financing of terrorism (CFT)
The contours of the FATF’s counterterrorism framework 
were agreed within just six weeks after 9/11, with no con-
sultation of national parliaments or civil society. Centred 
on the UN terrorist listing regime described in the previ-
ous section, the FATF rules set out a wide range of legal 
measures and due diligence obligations to be imple-
mented by states and private actors in order to prevent 
terrorist groups and their supporters utilising the bank-
ing system. Compliance with FATF rules is extremely 
onerous and non-compliance is not an option, with 
banks facing a range of sanctions including large fines, 
possible withdrawal of their banking licenses and crimi-
nal prosecutions. This has spawned a global compliance 
industry, already worth billions of euros annually.
The FATF recommendations on terrorist financing 
codified and expanded UN Security Council Resolution 
1373. They require states to, inter alia, ratify and imple-
ment all UN measures relevant to terrorist financing by 
enacting measures to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets, 
set-up reporting mechanisms for suspicious financial 
transactions related to terrorism, establish disclosure 
regimes around alternative remittance and ‘wire transfer’ 
systems, and review the adequacy of laws and regulations 
that relate to entities that risk being abused for the financ-
ing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations were singled-out 
by the FATF as ‘particularly vulnerable’ to exploitation by 
terrorist organisations (Recommendation 8 in FATF 2012, 
13). President George W. Bush had captured the thinking 
behind this approach in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: 
“Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they 
oftentimes use nice-sounding, non-governmental organi-
sations as fronts for their activities…. We intend to deal 
with them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid 
and abet terrorist organisations” (Rutzen 2015, 4).
In many countries, the liberal “rule of law” concept is more 
and more challenged by the “rule by law” concept, which 
facilitates discriminatory or repressive laws. 
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Implementing the FATF recommendations
Today the FATF has expanded its membership from 16 
initial members to 36 (FATF n.d.  a), and extended its 
reach across the world via eight further FATF-style 
regional bodies that promote and enforce the recommen-
dations. The eight FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) 
are the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Eurasian 
Group, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group, the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering in South America, the Inter-Govern-
mental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa, the Middle East and North Africa Financial 
Action Task Force and the Council of Europe Committee 
of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (see further 
‘Find a country’, FATF website, available at: www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries).The result is that more than 190 coun-
tries are now committed to implementing the latest itera-
tion of the 40 FATF recommendations. In Europe, the 
EU has transposed the FATF recommendations into EU 
law. The latest Directive on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money launder-
ing or terrorist financing was a direct response to the 
updating of the FATF recommendations in 2013 (Direc-
tive (EU) 2015/849).
The FATF’s recommendations have impacted CSOs 
and the wider non-profit sector in three fundamental 
ways. Firstly, they have been used as a vehicle for the 
imposition of new national legislation regulating non-
profit and civil society organisations across the world, and 
contributed to what is now a widely observed worldwide 
restriction of the ‘political space’ in which civil society 
operates. Secondly, states have been required by the FATF 
to adopt broad counterterrorism statutes, which have been 
used in a similar manner to clampdown on civil society 
activists. Third, in the attempt to lock terrorist groups out 
of the financial system, non-profits have found their 
capacity to move money around the world, and to fund 
particular activities and organisations in troubled regions, 
severely inhibited. These problems are discussed in sec-
tions 3 and 4 of this report, where the impacts of the 
Women human rights defenders are often at the forefront of the struggle to defend human rights. In many cases, they 
 additionally suffer specific forms of oppression, including sexualised violence.
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FATF’s CFT agenda will be shown to be fundamentally at 
odds with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The 
UN has recognised that a “lack of the rule of law and viola-
tions of human rights, ethnic, national and religious dis-
crimination, political exclusion, socio-economic margin-
alization and lack of good governance” are “conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism” (United Nations 
2006, para. 1). However, as the following section shows, 
there is growing evidence that FATF requirements are 
making it more difficult for the very grass roots and inter/
national civil society organisations addressing these issues 
to fulfil their mandates.
2.3 The European Union
The EU has developed an extensive body of counterter-
rorism law and policy, including sophisticated frame-
works for the designation and asset freezing of terrorist 
groups and countering the financing of terrorism more 
broadly. These follow the UN Security Council and FATF 
counterterrorism requirements extremely closely (a noted 
point of diversion is in respect to the right of appeal to 
the European Court of Justice against EU terrorist sanc-
tions, itself the result of a ruling that found the UN proce-
dures for blacklisting denied fair trial guarantees to those 
included on the UN 1267 list). As noted above, the EU is 
currently fast-tracking a draft Directive that will imple-
ment UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign 
fighters by expanding terrorist offences to include offences 
relating to ‘foreign fighters’, training and the financing or 
facilitation of such activities (European Commission 
2015). However, whereas the EU is regarded as a model 
pupil when it comes to implementing the FATF standards, 
civil society organisations have resisted the imposition of 
NPO regulations tied to FATF Recommendation 8 (R8).
EU Code of Conduct for non-profits rejected
The European Commission proposed a draft ‘Code of 
Conduct for Non-profit Organisations’ in 2005 to prevent 
the sector from being abused by terrorist organisations 
and to comply with FATF SR VIII (as Recommendation 8 
was then) (European Commission 2005). Member State 
governments meeting in the Council of the EU endorsed 
the draft Code without debate (Council of the European 
Palestinian and Israeli teenagers in a common project: Youth exchange and regional youth projects are one example of civil 
society activities which can help to prevent radicalization and extremism.
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Union 2005). A public consultation was launched and a 
coalition of European NGO platforms called on govern-
ments to reject the draft code on the grounds that the 
European sector “already has inherent mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability and is already subject to 
national legislation and control.” The coalition argued 
that “unless evidence is advanced to the contrary, strong 
doubts are justified as to whether this initiative is propor-
tionate to the actual threat… while aiming at tackling 
what has not been demonstrated to be more than a mar-
ginal phenomenon, it could end up raising suspicion on 
the broader NPO sector and have very serious coun-
ter-productive effects” (Civil Society Contact Group 
2005). These are the same concerns that are now being 
levelled at the global Recommendation 8 process.
With the draft EU Code of Conduct apparently with-
drawn, the European Commission decided instead to 
fund two studies: one examining the extent of criminal 
abuse of the NPO sector (Matrix Insight 2008), the other 
examining self-regulatory initiatives (European Center for 
Not-For-Profit Law 2009). The studies confirmed what the 
coalition of NGO platforms had suggested: the problem of 
terrorist abuse of NPOs in Europe was extremely rare and 
existing standards of transparency and accountability 
were largely sufficient. Nonetheless, in 2009 a demand for 
“legal standards for charitable organisations to increase 
their transparency and responsibility so as to ensure com-
patibility with Special Recommendation (SR) VIII of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)” was included in the 
draft legislative programme of the EU for 2010-14 (State-
watch 2010). More concerted advocacy from European 
civil society organisations followed and the proposal was 
ultimately restricted to “promot[ing] increased transpar-
ency and responsibility for charitable organisations with a 
view to ensuring compatibility with [Recommendation 8]” 
(European Foundation Centre 2009). In 2010, the Euro-
pean Commission issued ‘voluntary guidelines’ for Euro-
pean NPOs (European Commission 2010); these too were 
strongly criticised by civil society organisations, which 
described them as wholly unnecessary (European Foun-
dation Centre 2010). Subsequently, they have not been 
promoted by the Commission.
EU AML-CFT risk assessment
As noted earlier, EU member states are currently trans-
posing (implementing) the provisions of the fourth EU 
anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing 
Directive, adopted in 2015, into national law (Directive 
EU 2015/849). Under Article 6 of that Directive, the Euro-
pean Commission is currently conducting an assessment 
of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing 
on the internal market. A report containing its prelimi-
nary findings was produced in October 2016.
The non-profit sector was among 16 sectors and activ-
ities deemed to be “at risk” of terrorist financing. The jus-
tifications that were provided were that terrorist support-
ers could establish of non-profit organisations to “fund 
raise” for terrorist purposes domestically and overseas, or 
that terrorists funders could “abuse” existing non-profits 
in order to fund terrorist acts, or to transfer funds to ter-
rorist groups abroad via organisations working at close 
proximity to terrorist groups (Non Profit Platform on the 
FATF 2016b).
As we shall see in the following section, it is this 
 thesis that has long provided a justification for the impo-




The FATF and the worldwide  proliferation 
of restrictive non-profit laws
International policies designed to prevent money laun-
dering and the financing of terrorist organisations are 
increasingly linked to the worldwide glut of restrictive 
regulations governing charities and non-profits (cf. Kiai 
2013, 8-9). The hypothesis promoted by the FATF is that 
terrorists hide behind CSOs or use them to funnel money, 
and that this requires states to enact a range of coun-
ter-measures. The FATF’s standards now represent an 
essential element of the global ‘good governance’ agenda 
promoted by the UN, EU, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and regional development banks. 
According to FATF Recommendation 8:
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regula-
tions that relate to entities that can be abused for the 
financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are par-
ticularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that 
they cannot be misused:
(i)  by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate 
entities;
(ii)  to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist 
financing, including for the purpose of escaping 
asset freezing measures;
(iii)  and to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion 
of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terror-
ist organisations.
When Recommendation 8 was adopted, the FATF 
claimed that it had been “demonstrated that terrorists 
and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO sector to raise 
and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage 
terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organ-
isations and terrorist activity” (Specifically, the Task Force 
identified five categories of possible abuse of non-profit 
organisations by terrorist entities: (a) diversion of funds; 
(b) affiliation with a terrorist entity; (c) support for recruit-
ment; (d) abuse of programming; (e) false representation 
and “sham” non-profit organisations – see further Emmer-
son, 2015b: para. 17). These claims have been contested 
repeatedly by NGOs and regulators, who stress that 
despite a few high-profile cases, actual incidences of regis-
tered non-profits engaging in support for terrorism are 
extremely rare, and negligible compared with the overall 
size of the sector (A report for the European Commission, 
published in 2008, found “limited abuse of foundations” 
– see Matrix Insight 2008; The UK Charities Commission 
has also reported that “actual instances of abuse have 
proved very rare” – see Charity Commission 2008; while 
the U.S. Treasury has acknowledged that the vast majority 
of the 1.8 million U.S. charities “face little or no terrorist 
financing risk” – see Council on Foundations Press 2010). 
In July 2014, the FATF produced a new “Typologies report” 
on Recommendation 8 designed to highlight the modus 
operandi used by terrorist financiers (FATF 2014b). It was 
based on just over 100 (unpublished) case studies of ter-
rorist abuse in the NPO sector, derived from governments 
and open sources. The report was strongly criticised by 
CSOs and non-profits for conflating “vulnerability” and 
“risk”, implying that “the NPO sector as a whole faces sys-
temic risk or abuse” in the absence of a credible evidence 
base. The report also failed to recognise the counter-risk 
of over-regulation to NPOs “doing critical work that saves 
lives and provides an alternative to the terrorist narrative” 
(Charity and Security Network 2014). Repeated asser-
tions claiming a link between non-profits and terrorist 
groups are seen to have done considerable damage to the 
reputation of the sector as a whole, particularly to Muslim 
non-profits in western states (UN Counter Terrorism Task 
Force 2009). While no-one is questioning the need for 
transparency and accountability in the non-profit sector, 
many have questioned whether the FATF is an appropri-
ate or legitimate venue for such a sensitive area of inter-
national standard-setting (see further Section 8).
Whereas FATF Recommendation 8 simply called on 
states to review the adequacy of their laws and regula-
tions as far as they relate to non-profits, the FATF’s 
“Interpretative Note” (FATF 2012, 54-58), “Best practices” 
(FATF 2015a) and “Handbook for countries and asses-
sors” (FATF 2009) significantly expand the requirements 
stemming from the recommendations, calling inter alia 
for the licensing or registration of non-profits, the intro-
duction of extensive record-keeping, reporting and vet-
ting requirements (including a “know your beneficiaries 
and associates”-principle) and encouraging increased 
police scrutiny of the non-profit sector. When imple-
menting FATF Recommendation 8, states were encour-
aged to use the guidance and best practice to inform their 
domestic policy development. Taken together, these doc-
uments expanded the focus of Recommendation 8 from 
counterterrorism to CSO transparency and accountabil-
ity writ large. Crucially, the drafters of Recommendation 
8 also tried to restrict the focus of the regime to legal enti-
ties or organisations primarily engaged in raising or dis-
bursing funds. In their Interpretive Note to Recommen-
dation 8, they further restricted supervisory measures to 
those organisations accounting for “a significant portion 
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of the financial resources and a substantial share of the 
sector’s international activities” (FATF 2012, 56). Taken 
together, these measures should have limited the reach of 
Recommendation 8 to a small subset of what most coun-
tries would regard as their non-profit sector (i.e., exclud-
ing small and informal organisations, advocacy groups 
and many others). In practice, however, very rarely, if 
ever, is legislation regulating non-profits limited to spe-
cific types of organisation (Moreover, the FATF’s Recom-
mendation 8 “Typologies report” suggests that counter-
terrorism specialists are at least as concerned with 
smaller, informal organisations with little public visibil-
ity in donor countries as they are with more established 
INGOs – FATF 2014).
Transparency and accountability in the non-profit 
sector is of course as important and welcome as in any 
other area of public interest. Since the 1990s, a variety of 
national and international initiatives and best practice 
guidance around aid transparency, budget reporting, 
governance standards and due diligence have been 
adopted by CSOs throughout the world. While compli-
ance may be patchy and gaps remain, the extent of 
self-regulation and good practice has been largely over-
looked by those enforcing Recommendation 8.
In 2016, following sustained pressure and advocacy 
by civil society and non-profit organisations, the FATF 
introduced changes designed to limit the scope of Rec-
ommendation 8 to ‘vulnerable’ NPOs. These changes are 
discussed in section 3.3.
3.1 Ensuring compliance
As noted in section 2, more than 190 countries are now 
committed at ministerial level to implementing the FATF 
standards. Their efforts are kept under continuous review 
by the FATF and its eight regional formations, with an 
extensive cycle of assessment and follow-up mechanisms 
used to evaluate and improve states’ compliance with 
each of the 40 recommendations. As part of every cycle 
Figure: Chronology of key global coalition inputs and revisions to FATF documents 
Source: European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL)
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(each lasts around six or seven years), all states commit-
ted to the FATF’s standards are subject to a ‘peer review’ 
to assess their compliance with the 40 recommendations. 
The current (fourth) round of “mutual evaluations” com-
menced in 2014. Teams of inspectors made up of experts 
and practitioners from neighbouring states, FATF 
regional bodies, the World Bank or IMF, visit and analyse 
the laws and practices of each country, awarding a grade 
– “compliant”, “largely compliant”, “partially compliant” 
or “non-compliant” – for each of the recommendations 
(Basel Institute on Governance n.d.). Because the FATF 
standards have become a central feature of the global 
‘good governance’ agenda, good compliance ratings from 
the FATF are imperative for developing countries seek-
ing aid, trade and investment.
This process wields remarkable power. If countries 
fail to cooperate with the FATF, they are blacklisted as 
“high-risk” or “non-cooperative jurisdictions” (FATF 
n.d. b). Following an FATF evaluation, all countries must 
report back periodically on the measures they have 
enacted to address any shortcomings identified by their 
review. The governments of countries with “strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies” – that is states that fail to comply 
or largely comply with ten or more “key and core” recom-
mendations – are placed on what is known as the “grey 
list”. This has serious implications for those countries’ 
economies, with FATF sanctions indicative of significant 
risk to trade and investment. In turn, their governments 
must submit to an FATF International Cooperation 
Review Group and agree an Action Plan and timetable for 
reform, both of which are subject to further monitoring. 
So although the FATF’s recommendations do not have 
the legal status of an intergovernmental convention (there 
is no formal basis in international law for the FATF, 
unlike comparable international standard-setting bodies 
created by international treaties, such as the UN, EU or 
CoE), in practice they can have at least as potent an effect 
on national law, which must be amended to implement 
the requirements therein. This process lacks democratic 
legitimacy because Action Plans are drawn-up by the 
FATF or its regional formations, adopted by national gov-
ernments, and withheld from public scrutiny. In the case 
studies provided on the following section, the use or 
threat of grey/blacklisting by the FATF is shown to have a 
tremendous impact in terms of pushing through meas-
ures that lack democratic legitimacy, have been rejected 
by national parliaments, and in some cases heavily criti-
cised on human rights grounds.
3.2 The impact on non-profits
In April 2012, Statewatch and the Transnational Insti-
tute published research examining the mutual evalua-
tion reports on 159 countries with respect to Recommen-
dation 8 (Hayes 2012). It found that 85 per cent were 
rated as “non-compliant” or only “partially compliant”, 
fueling concerns that all of these countries could come 
under pressure to introduce new regulations that 
threaten civil society space during their next FATF eval-
uation (Shillito 2015). It should be pointed out that Rec-
ommendation 8 “is not unique in terms of its low levels 
of compliance; other recommendations are equally bad, 
if not worse” (ibid.). The report showed how the FATF 
and its regional formations had already endorsed or 
encouraged restrictive non-profit regulations in coun-
tries including Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Egypt, India (see further Box 1, below), Indonesia, Para-
guay, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and 
Uzbekistan. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks 
also showed how the US government had encouraged 
strict Recommendation 8 compliance in (among other 
countries) Azerbaijan (Wikileaks 2009a), Bahrain (Wiki-
leaks 2006d), Kuwait (Wikileaks 2006b), Morocco (Wiki-
leaks 2006c), Nigeria (Wikileaks 2009b), Russia (Wiki-
leaks 2008a), Saudi Arabia (Wikileaks 2008c), the United 
Arab Emirates (Wikileaks 2006a) and Yemen (Wikileaks 
2007b). None of these countries are known for maintain-
ing a favorable climate for non-profits.
In 2015, the Human Security Collective and State-
watch produced more qualitative research that examined 
the impact of Recommendation 8 in 17 countries partici-
pating in the MONEYVAL (Central and Eastern Europe) 
and Eurasian Group regional FATF formations (Hayes/
Jones 2015). It found that “all have introduced some new 
legislation or regulatory standards in response to the 
MONEYVAL/EAG evaluation process, even though not 
all appear to be in agreement with the assumptions on 
which Recommendation 8 is based” (ibid.). The report 
also found that whereas Recommendation 8 requires that 
states undertake a full risk assessment of the terrorist 
financing threat in their non-profit sector to determine 
whether new regulations are necessary, this had not been 
done by many of the MONEYVAL and Eurasia group 
members. Where states did undertake such a review and 
concluded that their NPO sectors face a minimal risk 
(e.g. Andorra, Kazakhstan, Montenegro and Slovakia), 
the FATF evaluators still demanded that those countries 
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introduce new NPO regulations. Further, whereas the 
reach of Recommendation 8 is supposed to be expressly 
limited to a small subset of what most countries would 
regard as their non-profit sector (i.e. excluding small and 
informal organisations, advocacy groups and many oth-
ers), the research found that in practice there was no 
attempt on the part of states meeting their Recommenda-
tion 8 obligations to limit their regulatory or supervisory 
measures in this way. It was also “clear that the demands 
for more stringent oversight and regulation of the NPO 
sector made by FATF regional formations were a signifi-
cant factor in the passing of legislation subsequently 
used against NPOs.” Particular concern was expressed 
about the impact of this legislation on civil society actors 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see further Box 1, below), 
Croatia, Macedonia, Hungary, India, Kazakhstan, Kir-
gizstan, Poland, Serbia and Tajikistan (ibid., 55).
Concerns that the requirements of FATF Recom-
mendation 8 have been abused by States seeking to 
reduce civil society space or suppress political opposition 
have been reiterated by the UN’s Special Rapporteurs on 
Freedom of Assembly and Association (Kiai 2013, para. 
25), and on Counterterrorism and Human Rights. The 
latter, Ben Emmerson QC, has stated that “Recommen-
dation 8 has proved to be a useful tool for a number of 
States as a means of reducing civil society space and sup-
pressing political opposition” (Emmerson 2015b, para. 
24). As noted above, the laws adopted by states in the 
name of compliance with Recommendation 8 can take 
various forms and have multiple effects. Of particular 
concern are wholesale domestic statutes regulating the 
activities of non-profits which introduce licensing or reg-
istration procedures. These can provide governments 
with wide discretion in deciding whether CSOs can be 
established and/or allowed to continue operating. Simi-
larly, laws restricting or introducing the power of veto 
over foreign funding can have tremendous consequences 
for donors and beneficiaries. These rules can be tied to 
terrorist financing requirements because states are 
encouraged to monitor international transactions. Box 1 
provides examples of civil society laws related to FATF 
evaluations and procedures and their impact on CSOs.
Box 1: How the FATF has promoted restrictive non-profit 
and counterterrorism laws
BANGLADESH: “Restricting the work of civil society” to “eliminate militant and terror financing”
In 2009, the regional FATF body found that Bangla-
desh had “No overall strategy to identify and address 
AML/CTF risks within NPO sector”, that “Supervision 
of NPOs is inadequate” and that a “significant portion 
of the NPO sector remains outside of formal regula-
tion and supervision” (Asia/Pacific Group on Mon-
ey-Laundering 2009). The Bangladesh government 
agreed an Action Plan to address these and other 
shortcomings the following year, and in April 2012 
announced that the finances of non-profits would be 
subject to greater scrutiny. This was reportedly to avoid 
the country being “downgraded from the current ‘grey 
list’ to ‘dark grey list’ of FATF” (Ahsan 2012). Later that 
year, the government established a commission to 
work towards bringing all NGOs under the jurisdiction 
of a single authority, to investigate the operations of 
NGOs allegedly “involved in terror financing and 
other anti-state activities”, and to develop a new law to 
regulate their activities (International Center for Not-
for-Profit Law n.d. a). The government also estab-
lished a database of NGOs at the Ministry of Finance 
to support the work of the Commission (ibid.). In 2014, 
a Bill regulating NGOs in receipt of foreign funding 
was approved (bdnews24.com 2014), with the stated 
goal of “eliminat[ing] militant and terror financing 
and ensur[ing] a terrorism-free Bangladesh by 2021” 
(New Age 2015). If enacted, the Foreign Donations 
(Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act would require 
organisations to register with the NGO Affairs Bureau 
and obtain prior approval to receiving foreign funding 
for any voluntary activity on a project-by-project basis. 
Human rights groups have called on the Bangladesh 
Parliament to reject these measures, which they say 
are part of a “systemic approach by the Bangladesh 
authorities to stifle free expression and severely restrict 
the work of civil society” (OMCT 2015).
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BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: Parliament rejects proposed NGO laws, FATF adds BiH to blacklist
In 2009, a regional FATF evaluation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) conducted by MONEYVAL found 
the country to be “non-compliant” with the require-
ments of Recommendation 8 (Hayes/Jones 2015, 18-21). 
Reasons given for this included “deficiencies of the reg-
istration mechanism” and “deficiencies of the supervi-
sory activities and inspections”. In 2011, the govern-
ment approved a MONEYVAL Action Plan to address 
these and other failures with respect to the FATF rec-
ommendations. Over a three year period, the BiH gov-
ernment submitted eight compliance reports to MON-
EYVAL detailing the work it had undertaken. The last 
of these explained that “With regard to steps taken to 
remedy the deficiencies in [Recommendation 8 compli-
ance], the Ministry of Justice of [BiH] prepared amend-
ments to the Law on the Establishment of a Joint Reg-
istry of Non-Governmental Organisations in [BiH], 
which also did not receive support and has also been 
rejected by the Parliamentary Assembly [along with 
proposed amendments to the Criminal Code]”. In 2015, 
the FATF added BiH to its list of countries with strate-
gic AML/CFT deficiencies, citing, among other rea-
sons, the failure to implement “adequate AML/CFT 
measures for the non-profit sector” (FATF 2015d).
BRAZIL: Counterterrorism law criminalising social movements opposed by UN, demanded by FATF
In February 2016, Brazil’s House of Representatives 
passed a counterterrorism bill described by domestic 
human rights groups as “a serious setback for democ-
racy because, under the justification of protecting the 
country, the law aims to criminalize social movements 
and activists fighting for their rights” (Conectas 2016). 
Human Rights Watch has urged the Brazilian President 
to veto the bill (Human Rights Watch 2016a), which 
was also condemned by the UN Commissioner for 
Human Rights in South America (Telesur 2016) and 
four UN Special Rapporteurs (Conectas 2015). The Bill 
was published in 2013 in response to a 2010 evaluation 
by the FATF which had found Brazil to be “non-compli-
ant” with key FATF terrorist financing recommenda-
tions, and strongly criticised the absence of dedicated 
counterterrorism legislation (GAFISUD 2010). How-
ever, there are no active terrorist groups in Brazil and all 
previous legal proposals in this area have been rejected 
by legislators, in large part because they had been una-
ble to agree on a definition of ‘terrorism’. In November 
2015, the FATF named Brazil in a report to the G20 on 
combating the funding of ISIS as one of the few coun-
tries not to have adopted a dedicated law (FATF 2015e). 
Then on 19 February 2016, just days before the final 
vote in the Brazilian congress, the FATF plenary issued 
a statement demanding that Brazil “fulfil its FATF 
membership commitment” by adopting the legislation, 
and threatening “follow-up” measures if it failed to do 
so (FATF 2016). In advance of the vote, government 
ministers warned lawmakers that if Brazil did not 
approve the measure it would face sanctions from the 
FATF (Telesur 2016). The Bill was adopted.
CAMBODIA: New law “threatens the very existence of a free and independent civil society”
Cambodia was rated “partially compliant” with FATF 
Recommendation 8 by a regional evaluation con-
ducted in 2007. Despite the absence of effective rule 
of law in Cambodia, the FATF report called on the 
government to adopt a “comprehensive legal frame-
work to govern the activities of NPOs” (Hayes 2012, 
32-3). A first draft of the new law was published by the 
Royal Government of Cambodia in 2010. Revised 
drafts were published in 2011, with a final draft of the 
Law on Associations and NGOs promulgated in 
August 2015 – despite, according to the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “wide protests from 
 citizens, civil society and the international commu-
nity regarding both its content and the lack of mean-
ingful public participation in crafting the law” (Inter-
national Center for Not-for-Profit Law n.d. b). Dur-
ing the legislative passage, the ruling Cambodian 
People’s Party maintained that the measures were “a 
necessary defence against international money laun-
dering and terrorist groups aiming to funnel their 
funds into Cambodia via NGOs” (Naren 2015). By 
contrast, the Office of the UN Human Rights Com-
missioner said that the law “threatens the very exist-
ence of a free and independent civil society” (UN 
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News Centre 2015). The law introduces mandatory 
registration for all domestic and international associ-
ations, provides unfettered ministerial discretion 
over registration (ibid.), and requires “political neu-
trality” of all associations and NGOs (International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law n.d. b). The Cambo-
dian government has also taken the unprecedented 
step of placing civil society leaders within the scope 
of its 2010 Anti-Corruption Law by requiring them to 
disclose their assets (ibid.).
EITHIOPIA: FATF’s blacklisting of Ethiopia leads to consolidation of repressive laws
Ethiopia ranks 174th out of 188 countries on the UN’s 
Human Development Index and is one of the world’s 
largest recipients of development aid (UN Develop-
ment Programme n.d.). Following widely criticised 
elections in 2005, the international community sus-
pended support for the Ethiopian government after it 
cracked down on civil society and detained an esti-
mated 40,000 opposition supporters (Tronvoll 2012, 
275). This stance was short-lived due to the country’s 
humanitarian situation and its strategic importance 
relative to the wider region. The Ethiopian govern-
ment emerged stronger and proceeded to adopt 
far-reaching laws restricting the financial and public 
operations of political parties, civil society, the media 
and INGOs in the country, as well as publishing a dra-
conian anti-terrorism proclamation (ibid., 274-5). In 
2010, the FATF added Ethiopia to its blacklist of coun-
tries that had not committed to implementing its rec-
ommendations, and demanded it work with the FATF 
“to develop a viable AML/CFT regime in line with 
international standards” (FATF 2010). As a result of 
this cooperation, which began with the adoption of a 
joint Action Plan in 2012, Ethiopia passed a new ter-
rorist financing law in 2013 which cemented the exist-
ing anti-terrorism regime and extended oversight of 
the charitable sector (Proclamation No. 780/2013). In 
October 2014, the FATF removed Ethiopia from its 
blacklist and congratulated the country on the pro-
gress it had made in addressing its AML-CFT defi-
ciencies (FATF 2014c). A month earlier, six UN Spe-
cial Rapporteurs had urged the Ethiopian government 
“to stop misusing anti-terrorism legislation to curb 
freedoms of expression and association in the coun-
try” (UN OHCHR 2014). The EU, UN, US State 
Department and numerous human rights organisa-
tions have assessed the existing laws as extremely 
restrictive and in 2015 even the FATF questioned the 
“broad level of oversight” which it said was “not justi-
fied” by the terrorist financing risks facing the country 
(ESAAMLG 2015, para. 153).
INDIA: From US-led FATF courtship, to the systematic silencing of dissent
India has long been of strategic importance to the 
FATF. Despatches from the US embassy in Delhi 
between 2006 and 2009, published by Wikileaks, show 
how “strong interest” from “top GOI [government of 
India] officials” in joining the FATF was used by the 
US government to solicit AML-CFT reforms (Wikile-
aks 2006e, 2006f, 2007a). One of the cables specifically 
welcomed amendments to the Prevention of Money 
Laundering Act (PMLA), which brought “non-govern-
mental bodies including charitable trusts, temples, 
churches, mosques and educational institutions under 
the purview of the PMLA” (Wikileaks 2009c). It further 
explained that “The amendments will place NPOs 
under higher scrutiny by banks and financial institu-
tions for large money transactions and suspicious 
transactions” and dismissed “NPO concerns that the 
amended PMLA may make receiving [financial] assis-
tance more difficult” (ibid.). Nevertheless, in July 2010 
an FATF evaluation found India “non-compliant” and 
called on its government to “implement measures to 
ensure that all NPOs are licensed and/or registered as 
such and make this new information available to the 
competent authorities” (Asia/Pacific Group on Mon-
ey-Laundering 2010). Later that year, the Indian gov-
ernment amended the already restrictive Foreign Con-
tributions Act (FCRA) to allow it to withdraw the per-
mits of NGOs designated as “organisations of a politi-
cal nature” (Ministry of Law and Justice India 2010). 
US Treasury officials welcomed the reform as “consid-
erable thinking” on CFT that “would provide an excel-
lent example to other countries in [the] South Asia 
region” (Wikileaks 2008b); it has clearly inspired not 
only Bangladesh (above), but also Pakistan. In May 
2015 Pakistan’s Federal Government finalised a revised 
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draft law in line with the National Action Plan (NAP) 
to monitor activities and foreign funding of local and 
international NGOs. Under the draft law, interna-
tional NGOs will be required to register with the Eco-
nomic Affairs Division and sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) valid for up to five years. A cen-
tral data system would be set up to enable NGOs to 
post their annual financial, performance and audit 
reports (see The Non Profit Platform on the FATF 
website). As part of the evaluation follow-up process, 
the FATF noted in 2013 that “The Review of Foreign 
Contribution by NPOs and the new Foreign Contribu-
tion (Regulation) Rules, 2010, together with the out-
reach activities being undertaken, enable the authori-
ties to focus on higher risk NPOs”, although it still 
found that India’s “level of compliance was not yet 
equivalent to LC [largely compliant]” (FATF 2013b). 
By this time, more than 4,000 Indian civil society 
organisations had had their FCRA permits suspended, 
including almost 800 in Tamil Nadu, location of mas-
sive protests against the Kudankulam nuclear site 
(Hayes 2013). Almost 9,000 more had their permits 
cancelled in 2015 (Kalra 2015), leading to widespread 
concern at the government’s systematic use of the 
FCRA to silence dissent (Mathur 2015). In October 
2016, 25 NGOs were refused to renew their FCRA 
licences, as “they were found to be indulged in ‘activi-
ties that are inimical to the national interest.” Most of 
these 25 NGOs were working in the field of human 
rights and community empowerment (Daily News and 
Analysis 2016a). At the end of 2016, the Home Minis-
try declared that its review of NGOs let to the cancella-
tion of FCRA licences of around 20,000 NGOs (Daily 
News and Analysis 2016b).
TURKEY: Terror-financing law adopted on threat of FATF sanctions, welcomed by ratings agencies
In a very similar process to that observed in Brazil, a 
controversial Terrorism Financing law approved by 
the Turkish Parliament in February 2013 was a direct 
result of pressure from the FATF. Critics had long 
argued that the draft law would be used to further stifle 
political opposition in a state that has been strongly 
criticised by the UN Human Rights Committee 
(among others) for using counterterrorism laws against 
politicians, activists, lawyers, journalists and human 
rights defenders. At its October 2012 plenary, the FATF 
issued a formal threat to suspend Turkey’s member-
ship by February 2013 unless the Bill was adopted. 
Prior to the Parliamentary vote, the Turkish Justice 
Minister warned legislators that if they failed to back 
the bill “the Turkish economy may face serious prob-
lems… money transfers from and to Turkey would be 
possible only after checks by the FATF… caus[ing] seri-
ous problems for Turkey’s exports, imports and hot 
money flow.” To underscore the extent of the pressure 
attached to FATF compliance, the global credit rating 
agency, Fitch, issued a written statement welcoming 
the subsequent adoption of the law.
UGANDA: Broad counterterrorism and NGO laws linked to AML-CFT deficiencies
Uganda was first evaluated by the regional FATF body 
in 2007 and deemed to be only “partially complaint” 
with Recommendation 8, and similarly weak with 
respect to many of the other recommendations (see 
Know Your Country: Uganda). Draft AML legislation 
was drawn up in 2003 but only presented to Parlia-
ment in 2009, and not adopted until 2013. According 
to US diplomatic cables from 2009, the “Finance Min-
istry would like to propose legislation that would 
closely monitor the financial transactions of NGOs, 
but cannot do so until Parliament passes the AML 
bill” (Wiki leaks 2009d). The delay has been attributed 
to political corruption within Uganda (ibid.), but may 
also reflect the fact that it was not until February 2014 
that the country was finally put on the list of countries 
with strategic AML-CFT deficiencies (FATF 2014a). 
In October that year, the regional FATF formation 
called upon Uganda “to expedite the amendments to 
the Anti-Terrorism law in conformity with the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards” (see Know 
Your Country: Uganda). New counterterrorism legis-
lation was duly adopted in June 2016, with opposition 
parties arguing that the new powers to freeze funds 
held in financial institutions or seize other funds or 
property with alleged ties to ‘terrorist’ activities were 
excessive and could potentially be used to stifle politi-
cal opponents (US Library of Congress Legal Monitor 
2015). With a second FATF evaluation pending, the 
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3.3 Incremental reforms
The USA, Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the UK 
responded to the first critiques of Recommendation 8 at 
the FATF plenary in October 2012. They circulated a state-
ment, endorsed by the World Bank, expressing concern 
that Recommendation 8 “is being used as justification to 
suppress the activities of legitimate NPOs and charitable 
and civil society organisations” and clarified that this was 
not the intention of the Recommendation. The following 
year, in preparation for the fourth round of mutual evalua-
tions, the FATF revised its assessment methodology to 
make it more “effectiveness-led” (FATF 2013a), and to 
encourage states to take a more pragmatic, “risk-based” 
approach (FATF 2013a, 15 & 116). Instead of simply asking 
whether states had the correct laws in place to implement 
the FATF recommendations (technical compliance), 
assessors are now also tasked with evaluating the practical 
effectiveness of the measures in question: “the extent to 
which the defined outcomes are achieved.” In respect to 
R8, the result of national implementing measures is sup-
posed to be that “Terrorists, terrorist organisations and 
terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving 
and using funds and from abusing the NPO sector” (see 
FATF 2013a). In respect to Recommendation 8, assessors 
are now explicitly asked to weigh “to what extent, without 
disrupting legitimate NPO activities, has the country 
implemented a targeted approach, conducted outreach 
and exercised oversight in dealing with NPOs that are at 
risk from the threat of terrorist abuse” (FATF 2013a, 116). 
However, in the absence of further guidance, it remains 
unclear if and how evaluators will factor into their assess-
ment any negative impacts of restrictive legislation and 
practice on CSOs and non-profits.
The FATF has also launched a formal dialogue with 
representatives of the non-profit sector, which until very 
recently, and unlike other stakeholders, had not been 
consulted on the development or implementation of 
those recommendations that impacted them (see further 
The Non Profit Platform on the FATF website). In June 
2015, the FATF revised its “Best Practices” guidance for 
“Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations” in 
accordance with Recommendation 8 (FATF 2015a). This 
document takes into account some of the concerns raised 
by representatives of the non-profit sector in nascent dis-
cussions with the FATF Secretariat. In particular it:
 • stresses the importance of legitimate charitable 
activities;
 • affirms the importance of a risk-based approach to 
NPO regulation,
 • recognises that a “one size fits all” approach to all NPOs 
is not appropriate;
NGO bill was proposed in April 2015 and adopted six 
months later. Domestic civil society groups argue that 
the legislation gives the government “unprecedented 
powers, including the ability to shut down non-gov-
ernmental organisations and jail their members” 
(News24.com 2015). LGBT rights groups have 
expressed particular concern about the new law, given 
Uganda’s stance and prior attempts to criminalise 
homosexuality (ibid.). The Robert F. Kennedy Center 
for Human Rights suggested that “Uganda’s NGO Bill 
is part of growing authoritarian contagion in the 
region, with Ethiopia’s 2009 Charities and Societies 
Proclamation serving as the ultimate blueprint” (Attiah 
2015). The second regional FATF evaluation of Uganda 
was completed in April 2016 using the new ‘effective-
ness-led’ methodology (see further below). The report 
was mildly critical of the Ugandan government for fail-
ing to conduct an assessment of terrorist-financing 
risks in the non-profit sector. It did not disapproved 
with the new law for being overbroad. However, it crit-
icised for failing to include provisions requiring 
non-profits to “maintain information on the purpose 
and objectives of their pronounced activities, issue 
annual statements describing breakdowns of their 
income and expenditure, be licensed and registered, 
have controls in place to ensure that all the funds they 
receive are accounted for and are used consistent with 
the purpose and the objectives of the NPO’s stated 
activities, maintain records of domestic and interna-
tional transactions which are made available to com-
petent authorities upon appropriate authority and 
follow a know your beneficiaries and associated NPOs 
rule”  (ESAAMLG 2016). As such Uganda was rated 
“non- compliant” with Recommendation 8 and is by 
default now expected to adopt even stricter regula-
tions in this area.
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 • states that “as a matter of principle, complying with 
the FATF recommendations should not contravene a 
country’s obligations under […] international human 
rights law;”
 • clarifies that Recommendation 8 “does not apply to the 
NPO sector as a whole” and is intended “to apply only 
to those NPOs that pose the greatest risk of terrorist 
financing abuse” (FATF 2015a).
Despite greater recognition of the importance of civil 
society’s role and an ostensibly more nuanced approach 
to non-profit regulation, it remains to be seen if it will be 
applied consistently by those evaluating and implement-
ing Recommendation 8. While there were some encourag-
ing signs in the form of the 2015 regional FATF evaluation 
of Ethiopia making critical remarks about the country’s 
restrictive NGO law in the context of the risks it faces 
(ESAAMLG 2015, para. 153), the evaluation of Uganda, 
which had recently adopted very similar legislation, does 
not bode well (see case studies above).
Regardless, concerns remain with respect to the 
impact of AML-CFT measures on fundamental rights 
guaranteed by international law, and over whether the 
FATF is the appropriate body to deal with the regulation 
of the non-profit sector. As several of the case studies 
above demonstrate (in particular that of Brazil), the FATF 
has used blacklisting and the threat of sanctions in order 
to push through the adoption of domestic terrorist-financ-
ing legislation. The breadth and criticism of some of the 
resulting statutes has made a mockery of the principle 
that complying with the recommendations should not 
result in statutes that contravene human rights.
In January 2016, 123 groups from 46 countries signed 
an open letter to the FATF calling for the revision of Rec-
ommendation 8 (The Non Profit Platform on the FATF 
website). In the letter, the coalition argued that the 
“unproven assumption that the entire NPO sector is ‘par-
ticularly vulnerable’ to terrorism financing abuse… has 
lent a veneer of legitimacy to States that have adopted 
legislation without due respect for their international 
human rights obligations.” It called for a revision of Rec-
ommendation 8 to ensure “a proportional and targeted 
approach” applicable only to those non-profit organisa-
tions identified as at risk.
In June 2016, the FATF duly amended Recommen-
dation 8 as follows:
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regula-
tions that relate to non-profit organisations which the 
country has identified as being vulnerable to terror-
ist financing abuse. Countries should apply focused 
and proportionate measures, in line with the risk-
based approach, to such non-profit organisations to 
protect them from terrorist financing abuse… 
[emphasis indicates new wording].
The Interpretative Note (IN) to Recommendation 8 
was also amended to incorporate the aforementioned 
“Best Practices” guidance for “Combating the Abuse of 
Non-Profit Organisations”. Additional amendments to 
the IN include:
 • stating that Recommendation 8 does not apply to all 
NPOs, just those at risk of terrorist financing, defined 
as an organisation that “primarily engages in raising 
or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, 
religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal 
purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of 
“good works”;
 • the requirement that states ‘should’ introduce licens-
ing, registration, record-keeping and reporting is now 
optional (states ‘could’ still introduce these measures);
 • NPOs are not required to conduct customer ‘due dili-
gence’, but ‘could be required to take reasonable 
measures to document the identity of their significant 
donors’).
That all NPOs are no longer viewed as ‘particularly 
vulnerable’ to terrorist financing is a welcome step and 
will be particularly helpful to established civil society 
organisations; so to the relaxing of the KYC require-
ments. However, as noted above, how the new ‘risk-based’ 
approach will be applied by states in practice remains to 
be seen. CSOs working at close proximity to conflict 
zones or ‘suspect communities’, particularly smaller, 
less-established or community-based groups will likely 
still be viewed as de facto ‘at risk’, while the potential for 
repressive governments to continue to use the IN as a jus-
tification for the implementation of onerous and/or 
restrictive CSO laws remains.
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Chapter 4
Don’t bank on it: How due diligence  
and ‘de-risking’ is limiting civil society’s 
access to financial services
In addition to bringing non-profits into the purview of 
counterterrorism, the FATF recommendations place an 
obligation on financial institutions and other businesses 
to police their customers for involvement in crimes under 
the FATF mandate. Increasingly, these obligations are 
impacting on relief and development work.
The proliferation of terrorist designations arising 
from UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (see further 
section 5) has meant that the risk of inadvertently provid-
ing financial services to a blacklisted terrorist group has 
increased exponentially. The FATF recommendations 
require states to impose “effective, proportionate and dis-
suasive” penalties on entities that breach sanctions 
regimes or fail to carry out proper due diligence (FATF 
2012, 26). Led by the USA, states have levied fines run-
ning into billions of dollars for such derelictions of duty. 
For example, in 2012 HSBC reached a settlement with US 
prosecutors and regulators by agreeing to pay $1.9 billion 
in relation to poor money laundering controls in Mexico 
(Viswanatha/Wolf 2012). According to an analysis by the 
Center for Global Development of AML, CFT and sanc-
tions-related fines, a quarter of the 40 largest non-US 
banks by assets have been fined by US regulators in the 
last five years (Center for Global Development 2015, 4). 
The banking sector as a whole now has little or no appe-
tite for this type of exposure, and appears to be engaged 
in extensive ‘de-risking’. This entails denying or with-
drawing financial services from individuals and organi-
sations with the wrong ‘risk profile’. While some financial 
experts distinguish between blanket and case-by-case 
‘de-risking’, arguing that the latter is a more legitimate 
business practice, it is the perception that the activities of 
INGOs and local civil society organisations are ‘high-
risk’ that is impacting those in the sector. The effects are 
particularly acute for those organisations working in or at 
close proximity to conflict zones and ‘suspect communi-
ties’, many of which have found themselves unable to 
send or receive money internationally, or significantly 
constrained by the conditions attached to the execution 
of such transactions.
4.1 Due diligence and non-profits
The FATF’s customer due diligence (CDD) recommenda-
tions include straightforward measures such as verifying 
customers’ identities, including any beneficial owners, 
assessing the purpose and nature of their business, and 
vetting financial transactions greater than 15,000 EUR/
USD to ensure that they are consistent with the institu-
tion’s knowledge of the customer, their business relation-
ships and the source of the funds. Beneficial ownership 
occurs where a person enjoys property rights even though 
the legal title of the property belongs to another person. 
Financial institutions are to ensure that they do not keep 
anonymous or fictitious accounts and confirm the veracity 
or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification 
data (see FATF Recommendation 10 in FATF 2012, 14).
“Enhanced customer due diligence” (ECDD), mean-
ing extra scrutiny, is required for all non-resident custom-
ers (FATF 2012, 59-67), and for all transactions with per-
sons and companies in countries that have been evalu-
ated by the FATF/FATF regional formations as having 
inadequate anti-money laundering and counterterrorism 
systems – some 53 countries at the time of writing (FATF 
n.d. b). The scope of ECDD is widened significantly by its 
application to money sent to or from countries that are or 
have been subject to international sanctions or embargos; 
to countries which have significant levels of corruption or 
crime; and to countries that have designated terrorist 
organisations operating within their territories. ECDD 
measures include obtaining additional information on 
the customer and the reasons for intended or performed 
transactions, and conducting enhanced monitoring of 
business relationships and transactions. Crucially, CDD/
ECDD must be exercised on both senders and recipients 
of wire transfers and international remittances as well as 
the intermediary sending institution (FATF Recommen-
dation 16 in FATF 2012, 15).
Researchers are only now beginning to explore the 
different ways in which the financial services sector inter-
prets and implements due diligence obligations, and in 
turn how this affects the non-profit sector. Discussions to 
date have focused on three particular issues. Firstly, as 
suggested above, banks appear to be implementing risk-
averse protocols that go beyond the FATF recommenda-
tions in order to minimise their exposure to risk (Met-
calfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 13). In practice, 
this means no longer processing transactions involving 
high-risk environments or actors. The increasing difficul-
ties in sending money to Somalia have been well-docu-
mented, for example (see further Box 2, below), restricting 
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the inflow of remittances from the Somali diaspora on 
which many people in the country depend (UN OHCHR 
2016). Secondly, the FATF due diligence requirements are 
seen to have increased the administrative burden on 
non-profits using financial services, thereby raising the 
cost of humanitarian action and “reducing the efficiency 
and timeliness of aid” (Emmerson 2015b, para. 41). This 
is observed not only in respect to dealings with financial 
institutions, but the increased time which some INGOs 
now spend complying with counterterrorism regulations 
more generally (ibid.). Thirdly, due to the difficulties they 
now face, it is suggested that some non-profits and their 
supporters are seeking alternative means to move money 
around the world. This may involve taking cash into the 
field or bypassing the banking system, for example by 
using personal rather than corporate accounts to transfer 
money, or using unregulated means to make and receive 
donations. Paradoxically, this leads to a reduction in the 
transparency and accountability that the FATF is trying 
to instil (Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 9).
4.2  The role of the compliance 
industry
Because customer and transactional due diligence obli-
gations have become so onerous, the FATF recommenda-
tions encourage banks to rely on third party service pro-
viders to perform CDD on their behalf (FATF 2012, 18). 
These companies perform functions such as screening 
customers against private sector databases to identify 
individuals and entities included in national and inter-
national sanctions lists, and conducting enhanced due 
diligence investigations on high risk customers. In prac-
tice, this has seen financial institutions effectively re-out-
source a significant part of the due diligence process to a 
burgeoning, global AML-CFT compliance industry that 
is already worth billions of dollars annually (KPMG esti-
mates that global annual expenditure on risk manage-
ment is likely to exceed $10 billion within the next two 
years (Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 18).
In particular, banks have turned to private sector 
intelligence databases derived from ‘open source’ material 
to check their customers for links to crime or terrorism. 
One of the AML/CFT compliance market leaders is World-
Check. Founded in 2000 and bought in 2011 by Thomp-
son-Reuters for $530 million, World-Check provides ser-
vices to more than 4,500 institutions, including 49 of the 
world’s top 50 banks and 200 law enforcement and regu-
latory agencies (Thomson Reuters n.d.). World-Check 
started out consolidating the names from the multitude 
of national and international sanctions lists so that their 
clients wouldn’t break the law by inadvertently providing 
financial services to blacklisted entities. World-Check 
and its competitors then went further; collecting and 
adding to their databases the names of people identified 
in the media or online as potentially associated in some 
way with terrorism. In 2008, World-Check’s database was 
reported to contain approximately 750,000 names; by 
2010 this number had grown to 1.2 million and by 2015 it 
had surpassed 2.5 million – higher by an order of magni-
tude than the number of people who have been convicted 
of actual offences within the FATF mandate.
The fundamental rights implications for those added 
to the World-Check database are substantial. In February 
2016, VICE news published an exposé of World-Check’s 
files which showed that the Executive Director of the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Nihad Awad, 
UK Liberal Democrat politician Maajid Nawaz, who 
founded the counter-extremism think tank Quilliam, for-
mer World Bank and Bank of England advisor Mohamed 
Iqbal Asaria CBE, the UK Palestine Solidarity Campaign, 
the Cordoba Foundation and “a number of other major 
British non-profits” had all been given a ‘terrorism’ desig-
nation in the database. It also showed that World-Check 
was relying on unsubstantiated or discredited online 
media reports (Shabibi/Bryant 2016).
Because of World-Check’s confidentiality clause, the 
overwhelming majority of people affected by its profiling 
will have no idea why they have been refused a bank 
account or had a transaction blocked. As a result, there is 
no quantitative data demonstrating the impact on 
non-profits. However, numerous reports (see further Box 2, 
below) have suggested that the inclusion of civil society 
organisations in World-Check’s databases has fundamen-
tally affected their ability to access financial services (cf. 
Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 110; Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/
Pantuliano 2015, 14). Several UK-based non-profits have 
launched defamation proceedings against World-Check, 
seeking recompense for these damages (cf. Donaghy 2016). 
Moreover, because the database is used by intergovern-
mental organisations, donors and INGOs, the inclusion of 
organisations or their employees can result in specific 
actors being rendered ineligible for funding or pending 
grants being blocked or withdrawn. As one former World-
Check board member put it: “If someone had a [terrorism] 
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hit on World-Check, that’s really end of story…you can’t do 
business with them anyway” (Shabibi/Bryant 2016).
4.3  The impact on development 
activities
‘De-risking’ is the financial sector’s response to the risks 
they face with respect to failures in due diligence – fail-
ures for which financial institutions may be held liable in 
the event that their customers are indeed, or later 
become, involved in money laundering, terrorist financ-
ing and other crimes under the FATF mandate. Although 
it is a relatively new phenomenon, it is clear that some 
banks have a lower appetite for risk than others, and are 
thus ‘de-risking’ more extensively, and that some institu-
tions interpret the FATF’s due diligence requirements far 
more rigidly than others.
Financial inclusion is a key part of the ‘good govern-
ance’ agenda promoted by the World Bank, UN, OECD 
and FATF, and investment in development in fragile states 
is seen as imperative to mitigate conflicts, prevent migrant 
and refugee flows and push back on violent extremist 
groups. ‘De-risking’ threatens to derail these objectives.
As several UN Special Rapporteurs have explained, 
the restrictions faced by NGOs because of risk aversion 
or ‘de-risking’ include the inability to open bank accounts, 
arbitrary closure of accounts, inordinate delays or termi-
nation of transactions, onerous obligations requiring 
detailed knowledge of donors and beneficiaries, and vul-
nerability to accusations of terrorist links (FATF 2015a, 
para’s 68-70).
Civil society appears to have been hardest hit in the 
USA and the UK, where banking regulations are particu-
larly stringent. A 2016 report commissioned by the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority suggested that “Top ‘house-
hold name’ charities are not de-risked, but small charities 
are… There was a fear that an avalanche of de-risking in 
the not-too-distant-future that might affect hundreds of 
charities” (Artingstall et al. 59). It is important to stress 
that the suspension or withdrawal of financial services 
can be devastating for small charities and civil society 
organisations, who are rendered unable to receive grant 
payments, maintain grass roots funding (such as stand-
ing orders or memberships), pay wages and suppliers, 
implement projects, or find alternative banking facilities.
Forthcoming research is expected to demonstrate that 
increasing reports of financial exclusion and disenfran-
chisement is indicative of a much wider geographical and 
political trend (see forthcoming research (2016) on this 
topic by Duke University and the Women Peacemakers 
Programme). In March 2016, for example, the Jordanian 
Civil society is recognised as an actor in development in its own right, which is especially valid for the challenging area of land 
reforms and land rights. Important elements to improve the situation and to achieve more equality for disadvantaged groups 
and landless people are their empowerment, but also awareness raising, information and advocacy at all levels of society. 
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banking association warned that “De-risking practices will 
likely result in the further isolation of vulnerable commu-
nities, particularly women, from the formal financial sec-
tor and may have wide-ranging humanitarian, economic 
and security implications” (Kandah 2016).
Further research is needed, but many organisations 
affected by ‘de-risking’ are reluctant to speak out, fearing 
reputational damage from the perception that there is ‘no 
smoke without fire’. While Muslim organisations appear 
to be most severely impacted – and believe that they are 
Box 2: How due diligence ‘de-risking’ hampers relief and 
development
In 2011, a USAID grant to one of South Africa’s largest 
humanitarian organisations was blocked because the 
Director’s name had a ‘terrorism’ designation in the 
World-Check database (source: personal correspond-
ence between author and party to the case). The desig-
nation was refuted by the organisation.
In 2011, Sunrise Community Banks, the largest pro-
vider of banking services for US-Somali remittances, 
decided to close all service provider accounts in order 
to better comply with US CFT regulations (Center for 
Global Development 2015, 16).
In 2012, Islamic Relief Worldwide, which has opera-
tions in over 30 countries, reported that incoming dona-
tions and outgoing payments were being blocked “on a 
daily basis” (Young 2012). At the end of 2015, HSBC 
closed the charity’s bank accounts (Mandhai 2016).
In 2012, the UK Muslim Charities Forum reported that 
three of its eight members had experienced difficulties 
in opening a bank account. Four members said that 
their most serious challenge in accessing financial ser-
vices was transferring funds, in particular in relation 
to their aid operations in Somalia, Sudan, the occu-
pied Palestinian territories and Iraq (Metcalfe-Hough/
Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 7).
In the spring of 2013, over 140 UK-based remittance 
companies received a notice from Barclays Bank indi-
cating that their accounts would be closed within sixty 
days and that the bank would no longer do business 
with them as a result of its new risk-based eligibility 
criteria (Center for Global Development 2015, 16).
An informal survey of humanitarian organisations in 
late 2013 by the Charity and Security Network found 
that more than half of the 51 respondents faced delays 
or blocks when moving money abroad and 15 per cent 
had experienced account closures (Transnational 
NGO Working Group on FATF 2014). A more in-depth 
survey is to be published by the network in late 2016.
In March 2015, the Guardian reported that millions of 
pounds of donations to charities had been inadvert-
ently held up, blocked or returned by banks – includ-
ing HSBC, UBS and NatWest – which had frozen 
accounts held by UK-registered charities and INGOs 
delivering aid in Syria, Gaza and Iraq.
An INGO wishing to remain anonymous, that was 
interviewed for an Overseas Development report pub-
lished in 2015, estimated that it had foregone £2 mil-
lion in donations in the space of a year as a result of 
funds being blocked (Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pan-
tuliano 2015, 7).
The US-based Syria Relief & Development organisa-
tion, which funds a hospital in Aleppo, had its account 
closed by Bank of America in the spring of 2015. The 
group moved its money to Wells Fargo but had its 
account closed after it tried to transfer funds to employ-
ees in Syria. Staffers didn’t get paid for four months in 
2015 because of these problems (Barry/Ensign 2016).
In March 2016, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
Chicago-based Zakat Foundation of America had had 
their accounts closed at three US banks. The charity 
said that in each case, the banks, which it declined to 
identify, did not provide a reason for the closures (ibid.).
A charity that funds a school in Turkey, which pro-
vides education to around 400 refugees from Syria, 
had their account closed by JP Morgan for no stated 
reason. After an inquiry from the Wall Street Journal, 
the bank reversed their decision (ibid.).
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being discriminated against precisely because of their 
religious affiliations – secular and other faith-based 
INGOs have also reported difficulties (Metcalfe-Hough/
Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 14). UN human rights experts 
have clarified that “the denial of banking facilities… with-
out reasonable suspicion that the targeted organisation or 
transaction constitutes support of terrorism or mon-
ey-laundering… on the basis of stereotypical assumptions 
relating to characteristics, such as religion or the predom-
inant race of the organisation’s membership or benefi-
ciaries, constitutes unjustified discrimination and is pro-
hibited under international law” (Kiai 2013, para’s 84-85).
4.4 Nascent reform efforts
In response to claims that its recommendations are to 
blame for these problems, the FATF has: launched an ini-
tiative to collect data on the phenomenon of de-risking; 
stated that financial institutions should not view NPOs 
as automatically high-risk simply because they operate in 
cash-intensive environments or in countries of great 
humanitarian need (FATF 2015a, para’s 68-70); clarified 
that banks should assess the risk of each client individu-
ally; and made it clear that high-risk clients can still be 
serviced subject to proper due diligence (FATF 2015b). 
However, as Oxfam USA suggests, banks are still “finding 
it easier to cut and run from small, high-risk clients” 
(Oxfam 2015).
De-risking is driven by a complex set of interrelated 
factors (these include perceived client risk, profitability, 
the cost of compliance, potential fines and penalties, rep-
utational and legal concerns, and an overall shift from 
corporate to individual liability), but the two which 
appear to most influence the way that the majority of 
banks and other financial service providers deal with 
INGOs are profitability and risk. More simply put: “the 
limited revenue that most INGOs may generate for a 
bank is not sufficient to justify the risks that banks believe 
doing business with INGOs will expose them to” (Met-
calfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 17). In the 
absence of specific instructions to the contrary, banks are 
spending billions building ever-more extensive risk and 
compliance departments – but they do not appear to be 
investing resources in enhancing their understanding of 
INGOs to the same degree as other categories of client 
(ibid.). In the meantime, INGOs have been liaising with 
national banks and regulators to provide short-term 
solutions to the most pressing crises (see for example the 
safer corridor pilot project in the UK, which was designed 
to protect remittance flows to Somalia and focuses on the 
ability of NGOs to send money to support their own oper-
ations; see British Bankers’ Association, the Disasters 
Emergency Committee and Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer llp 2013).
Initial concerns over the detrimental effects of de-risk-
ing on the non-profit sector were met with buck-passing by 
banks, regulators and governments. Financial service pro-
viders blamed the due diligence and CFT rules. Regula-
tors and standard-setting bodies, including the FATF, said 
the banks were applying those rules too zealously. Govern-
ments claimed that individual decisions about financial 
services were a matter for the banks. While all apparently 
now recognise that the problem exists and research has 
been commissioned into its extent, concrete proposals for 
what to do about it are conspicuous by their absence. 
Addressing the matter in his thematic report on the abuse 
of counterterrorism, the UN Special Rapporteur suggests 
the emerging “right to banking facilities” – itself a response 
to the widespread denial of financial services to the poor – 
could also benefit NGOs (Emmerson 2015b, para. 41).
The FATF, which recently expressed “serious concern 
[that] de-risking may drive financial transactions under-
ground which creates financial exclusion and reduces 
transparency, thereby increasing money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks” (FATF 2015c), remains silent on 
remedies for non-profits frozen out of the financial sys-
tem. Given the FATF is a consortium of national govern-
ments, it is clear that leadership on this issue can only 
come from government quarters. In February 2016, 58 
non-profit organisations representing more than $8.3 bil-
lion annually in humanitarian aid wrote to the US Depart-
ments of Treasury and State asking them to convene a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue as part of a broader effort to 
ensure that registered, law-abiding NPOs are able to 
access the global financial system (Charity and Security 
Network 2016). Informal dialogue between non-profit 
organisations, regulators and the banking sector is under-
way in several European countries. It is clear that if there 
is to be global traction on this complex, interdependent 




Undermining conflict resolution, hampering 
humanitarian action: terrorist ‘blacklisting’
As explained in previous sections, a complex web of inter-
national, regional and national ‘terrorist blacklists’ now 
spans the globe, containing hundreds of designated ‘ter-
rorist’ groups and thousands of their alleged members 
and supporters. Festering conflicts and struggles for 
self-determination have been subsumed by the rubric and 
praxis of the ‘war on terror’, transforming the  way in 
which political violence and armed conflict is understood 
and managed, and paving the way for new forms of war-
fare targeting ‘terrorist’ networks (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015).
The transnational impact of terrorist designation has 
long preoccupied legal scholars, who have struggled to 
reconcile the executive power exercised at supranational 
level by the UN Security Council and the EU Council with 
traditional notions of due process, fundamental rights 
and the rule of law – issues that have played out in national 
and international courts (Sullivan/Hayes 2010). While 
some groups and individuals have successfully challenged 
their ‘terrorism’ designations, the underlying legal ten-
sions have not been resolved to the satisfaction of human 
rights experts (Council on Foreign Relations 2013).
As well as criminalising ‘terrorist’ groups, a whole host 
of others including political parties, NGOs, charities, 
activists and dissidents have inevitably been caught in the 
‘terrorist’ net, whether listed directly or through their 
alleged association with listed parties. As noted by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human 
Rights, “the adoption of binding international and 
regional instruments proscribing material support for ter-
rorism, together with overbroad national legislation 
implementing those obligations or otherwise criminalis-
ing such support, can pose a significant threat to civil soci-
ety organisations, some of whose activities may – unwit-
tingly – constitute indirect material support according to 
the definitions adopted” (Emmerson 2015b, 13-14). This 
might include organising or attending a meeting, paying 
‘taxes’ or ‘providing information’ to banned organisations 
(Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 32-33).
The political space of organisations working at close 
proximity to listed entities, particularly those with the 
objective of resolving conflicts through dialogue and 
engagement, is thus constrained by real or perceived 
threats of prosecution. This in turn has serious conse-
quences for their programmes, partners and beneficiar-
ies (Mackintosh/Duplat 2013; Boon-Kuo et al. 2015; 
Dumasy/Haspeslagh 2016). Organisations become more 
risk averse, concerned that this type of work could harm 
their reputation or endanger their staff; projects 
involving groups in or around territories controlled by 
proscribed organisations are harder to fund and imple-
ment; and communities already sandwiched between 
armed factions and hostile state actors may lose support 
on which they depend. A recent report on ‘Terrorist List-
ing and Conflict Transformation’ commissioned by the 
Berghof Foundation argued that viewing these outcomes 
simply as ‘unintended consequences’, without question-
ing the broader legitimacy of the global counterterrorism 
architecture, is failing to capture a much more profound 
and transformative process – one which is reshaping the 
norms of conflict resolution, securitising relief and devel-
opment organisations, and paralysing the prospects for 
grass-roots peacebuilding (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015).
In addition to concerns about ‘shrinking space’, the 
need to comply with counterterrorism regulations 
undermines the perceived neutrality of relief and devel-
opment organisations, whose risk aversion and con-
formity may be placed above their humanitarian objec-
tives and interpreted by non-state actors and local pop-
ulations as ‘taking sides’. Just as military interventions 
in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention’ have under-
mined humanitarian action on the ground, the percep-
tion that INGOs have been co-opted into official coun-
terterrorism initiatives can constrain their capacity to 
operate in contested territories (Mackintosh/Duplat 
2013, 81; Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 50-51; Emmerson 2015b, 
18). This comes at a time when the credibility and legit-
imacy of humanitarian and development organisations 
is already undermined by other factors, including the 
broader mistrust of ‘western agendas’. Although human-
itarian organisations continue to assert and abide by 
their neutrality, the perception that they are not neutral 
is growing. So too is hostility toward development agen-
das predicated on human rights and democracy, par-
ticularly in countries that have become less dependent 
on western aid.
5.1 The role of the FATF
Whereas the relationship between the FATF recommen-
dations and the shrinking space and ‘de-risking’ discussed 
in the previous sections are increasingly becoming known, 
the role that the FATF has played with regard to the prolif-
eration of terrorist proscription is not well understood. 
The FATF acts firstly to ensure that terrorist financing 
offences are defined extremely broadly in national law, 
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and secondly to encourage states to establish their own 
domestic terrorist blacklists.
With regard to terrorism offences, the FATF recom-
mendations effectively expand the scope of the UN Ter-
rorist Financing Convention by requiring states to “crim-
inalise not only the financing of terrorist acts but also the 
financing of terrorist organisations and individual terror-
ists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or 
acts” (Recommendation 5, emphasis added) (FATF 2012, 
13). The FATF’s interpretive note on R5 goes even further, 
stating that “criminalising terrorist financing solely on 
the basis of aiding and abetting, attempt, or conspiracy is 
not sufficient” to comply with the recommendations, and 
that “financing offences should not require that the 
funds: (a) were actually used to carry out or attempt a ter-
rorist act(s); or (b) be linked to a specific terrorist act(s)” 
(FATF 2012, 37). Following the adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 2178 (see section 2.1, above), the 
scope of Recommendation 5 was effectively expanded by 
FATF guidance which clarified that “terrorist financing” 
included the financing of would-be ‘foreign fighters’.
With regard to terrorist blacklisting, the FATF rec-
ommendations not only remind states of their obliga-
tions to implement targeted financial sanctions regimes 
in order to comply with UN Security Council resolutions 
1267 and 1373 (FATF 2012, 13), but also include minimum 
standards to which national implementing regimes 
should adhere. Recommendation 6 thus requires states to 
blacklist entities that meet the criteria for terrorist desig-
nation on the basis of a domestic assessment or request 
of a foreign country using “an evidentiary standard of 
proof of ‘reasonable grounds’ or ‘reasonable basis’”. This 
is a much lower standard than is typically found in crim-
inal law, which requires proof beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ 
(FATF 2012, 39-46). Although R6 is one of only two out of 
the 40 FATF recommendations that contains an express 
reference to human rights, the reference is undermined 
by the use of executive powers and civil law evidentiary 
standards. Given the scope for overbroad definitions of 
‘terrorism’ and politically-motivated terrorist designa-
tions, there is a significant risk of arbitrary application of 
these provisions.
As with all FATF recommendations, the stringent 
evaluation enforcement mechanism means that states 
who fail to implement provisions are named-and-
shamed for non-compliance. While they are under a 
legal obligation to implement UN Security Council Res-
olutions, the demand that states make provision to 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna is also responsible for implementing the United Nations’ 
lead programme on terrorism.
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blacklist their own citizens in the absence of a UN desig-
nation is globalising a far-reaching sanction that had 
been used only in exceptional circumstances by demo-
cratic states prior to 9/11. At its December 2015 plenary, 
the FATF announced that it would be initiating special 
measures against countries which had not criminalised 
terrorist financing or did not apply targeted financial 
sanctions (FATF 2015f). A few days later, the UN Secu-
rity Council called on all states to implement FATF Rec-
ommendation 6, and called on the FATF to redouble its 
efforts to combat terrorist financing (United Nations 
2015c). Additional pressure to do more in this area is 
coming from the 37 member “Coalition Counter ISIL 
Finance Group” which is co-chaired by the United 
States, Italy, and Saudi Arabia as part of the broader 
international effort to degrade and defeat ISIL.
5.2  Counterterrorism and 
 humanitarian aid
Delivering humanitarian aid to civilian populations and 
running relief and development programmes in and 
around conflict zones is already fraught with difficulties 
and challenges that can threaten the safety of aid workers. 
Counterterrorism has added significantly to the prob-
lems that INGOs and their local partners face by intro-
ducing criminal liability for activities related to humani-
tarian programmes. As noted above, the offences in ques-
tion are intimately related to the criminalisation of ‘mate-
rial support’ for proscribed ‘terrorist’ organisations and 
may include the provision of funds, property or technical 
assistance to listed parties (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, ch. 1-2). 
Because banned organisations often control large 
swathes of territory and charge organisations fees for 
visas or entry permits, or impose taxes on their opera-
tions, the restrictions imposed by counterterrorism 
directly impact the mandate of humanitarian actors to 
provide relief to civilian populations (Emmerson 2015b, 
para. 38). INGOs face the risk that goods and services 
delivered to areas where terrorist groups are active may 
be diverted to those groups, or actors associated with 
those groups. The US listing of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist 
group in 2008 is seen to have paralysed aid to Somalia in 
the years that followed, with devastating effect. Com-
bined with the disregard for international humanitarian 
law by armed groups in Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Syria 
and Yemen, these restrictions have contributed to an 
extremely challenging climate for humanitarian relief 
organisations (see Box 3, below).
The growing body of counterterrorism legislation and regulation is also having a direct impact on humanitarian organisations 
by restricting funding and stalling project implementation.
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Box 3: How terrorist blacklisting hampers humanitarian and 
peacebuilding activities
Somalia: Since 2008, at which time the US listed 
Al-Shabaab as a terrorist group, a single instance of 
diverted aid or payments to local authorities is poten-
tially a crime under US law for which both USAID 
and its partners can be held accountable (Mackin-
tosh/Duplat 2013, 88). The proscription of Al-Shabaab 
coincided with the intensification of the Somalian 
conflict, the expulsion of several aid groups, reluc-
tance on the part of some humanitarian organisa-
tions to pay taxes to Al-Shabaab, and unprecedented 
scrutiny of aid organisations. The result was an 88 per 
cent decrease in aid to Somalia over the two years 
that followed (The Guardian 2013). In July 2011, the 
UN declared a famine in Somalia. By this time, nearly 
half of the country’s population of ten million was in 
need of immediate assistance (Charity and Security 
Network 2012). While the urgency of responding to 
the famine engendered “a shift from a cautious envi-
ronment to one where aid was delivered at all cost” 
(Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 86), counterterrorism 
requirements continue to hamper peacebuilding 
efforts in the aftermath of the famine. For example, a 
project in the Bakool region of southern Somalia that 
sought to help 300 youth fighters defect from 
Al-Shabaab was blocked by European and US donors 
because it would have meant providing economic 
resources to clans in Al-Shabbab controlled areas to 
support the youth fighters’ reintegration (Boon-Kuo 
et al. 2015, 91-92).
Gaza: After Hamas were elected in Gaza, their desig-
nation as a ‘terrorist’ organisation by the EU, US and 
other jurisdictions was augmented by a ‘no-contact’ 
policy with respect to Hamas officials. Some key 
donors also introduced ‘anti-terrorism’ clauses into 
grant agreements, which many key Palestinian organ-
isations refused (and still refuse) to sign on the basis 
that the clauses are prejudicial to legitimate resist-
ance to Israel’s occupation and human rights abuses 
(Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 95). In combination, these 
measures had a significant impact on the provision 
of humanitarian assistance and protection and para-
lysed many development efforts, leaving the territory 
suffering from both the ‘economic blockade’ and 
aid  dependency (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, ch. 4). Cash 
assistance programmes, funding for schools, hospi-
tals and mental health services, and peacebuilding 
efforts, were disrupted or rendered impossible. Dur-
ing Israel’s operation ‘Protective Edge’ in 2014, some 
INGOs operating in Gaza refrained from delivering 
aid to displaced Palestinians who had taken refuge in 
schools run by the Hamas government because they 
feared that doing so would transgress US counterter-
rorism legislation. For the same reason, some INGOs 
felt unable to provide rehabilitation support to gov-
ernment schools damaged or destroyed by Israeli 
forces (Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 
5). In August 2016 their fears were effectively con-
firmed as Israel charged staff from UNDP, World 
Vision and Save the Children with terrorist-funding 
(Beaumont 2016).
Turkey/Kurdistan: The terrorist designation of the 
PKK and its non-violent associates by Turkey, the EU, 
US and other jurisdictions has undermined the pros-
pects for peacebuilding in Turkey and neighbouring 
Kurdish regions (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, ch. 5). In the 
four years between 2009 and 2013, during the “demo-
cratic opening”, Turkey prosecuted almost 40,000 
people for the offences of membership of a terrorist 
organisation; aiding and abetting a terrorist organisa-
tion; and attempting to destroy the country’s unity 
and integrity. This appears to have been the largest 
counterterrorism operation in the world (ibid., 150-
151). The blacklisting of the PKK by much of the ‘inter-
national community’ means that there is no meaning-
ful pressure on Turkey to resolve the Kurdish conflict. 
Moreover, by treating the military campaign against 
Kurdish self-determination as a domestic ‘counterter-
rorism’ issue, rather than an armed conflict governed 
by international humanitarian law, the Turkish state 
has been able to act with greater impunity with the 
tacit support of its allies.
North Korea: In May 2013, European aid groups said 
their banks in Europe had stopped sending money to 
North Korea in the wake of the blacklisting of Pyong-
yang’s main foreign exchange bank, forcing “some 
agencies to carry suitcases of cash in from outside the 
country” (The Guardian 2013a; Rajagopalan 2013).
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Practical challenges are compounded by legal uncer-
tainty caused by the overlapping nature of different pro-
scription regimes and a range of variables that shape 
potential liability. Such variables include whether the ter-
rorist groups are proscribed at UN, EU or national level; 
the definitions of ‘terrorism’ or ‘material support’ attached 
to those regimes; where the NGO is registered, located or 
headquartered; the nationality of its staff and the origins 
of its funding; whether the applicable laws require actual 
intent to support a banned group or not; whether indirect 
support (i.e. to a third party associated with a terrorist 
group) can incur liability; and whether any of the relevant 
statutes apply extraterritorially (providing jurisdiction for 
states to prosecute offences that took place outside of 
their territory). In this context, it is often very difficult, 
even for well-resourced organisations, to ascertain the 
legal risks they face and to provide meaningful guaran-
tees to their staff regarding their potential liability.
Engaging with proscribed groups for humanitarian 
purposes is implicitly recognised under the Geneva Con-
ventions, which provide for “relief actions which are 
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted 
without any adverse distinction” (Additional Protocol 
1977). In response to widespread concern about the poten-
tial criminalisation of humanitarian aid workers, several 
initiatives to reduce or remove their legal liability have 
been developed. Security Council resolutions now man-
date access to territory under the control of proscribed 
groups for humanitarian purposes (for example the UN 
Security Council’s Somalia and Eritrea sanctions regimes, 
see further Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 39); some national laws 
criminalising material support have been amended to 
include humanitarian exemptions (for example the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand statutes, see further Emmerson 
2015b, para. 34); and provision has been made for aid 
organisations to apply for government licenses that allow 
them to deal with proscribed groups for the purpose of 
providing humanitarian aid (The Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the US Treasury can issue exemptions and the 
EU sanctions regime envisages the same – see further 
Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 39). However, the exemptions have 
done little to restore the confidence of aid groups and the 
licenses have proved ineffective or inaccessible in practice. 
The US licenses do not provide immunity against the 
criminal prohibition on providing material support or 
resources to proscribed terrorist organisations (Emmer-
son 2015b, para. 34), while the UK government has not 
provided any information on how and under what circum-
stances an INGO could potentially apply for such licences 
(Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 14). As the 
UN Secretary-General observed in 2010, the increasing 
appreciation by member states of the importance of 
engagement for humanitarian purposes has yet to trans-
late “into a willingness to refrain from adopting measures 
that impede or, in some cases, criminalize engagement 
with non-State armed groups” (United Nations 2010).
The prosecution of humanitarian organisations 
accused of supporting terrorist groups is relatively rare. 
But the conviction of the Holy Land Foundation for mate-
rial support for terrorism in the USA (Charity and Secu-
rity Network 2011), the shutting-down of the Interna-
tional Islamic Relief Organization in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, and the proscription of dozens of Islamic 
charitable and social organisations has had a wider chill-
ing effect (Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 108-111). The extra-
territorial reach of US law coupled with scores of high pro-
file investigations and a slew of allegations against Euro-
pean and Australian INGOs, often made by organisations 
and individuals pursuing an overt political agenda, have 
amplified these effects. Among the many organisations 
Syria: According to a recent Thompson Reuters report, 
a survey of NGOs operating in ‘jihadi-run’ areas 
reported widespread concern about “dealing with 
armed groups and fears of running afoul of anti-terror-
ism laws” (Esslemont 2016). INGO’s reported that 
demands for additional compliance were hampering 
their activities in the areas most affected by conflict. 
“Anti-terrorism legislation and licensing requirements 
reduce our nimbleness and slow down our effective-
ness in reaching vulnerable people because of onerous 
reporting,” one country director said. The Syrian NGO 
Alliance (SNA), a consortium of 90 NGOs working in 
the country, said its members were having to cancel 
projects because they could not keep up with the 
paperwork required by donors. “This is really bad for 
Syrian people, who end up being more vulnerable to 
joining the terrorist groups because they do not get the 
humanitarian assistance,” said SNA coordinator Fadi 
Hakim. “The other option for many of them is to then 
join the exodus of Syrian refugees.”
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subject to investigations predicated on allegations of asso-
ciation with proscribed terrorist groups are, in the USA, 
Benevolence International Foundation, Islamic Ameri-
can Relief Agency, KindHearts for Charitable Humani-
tarian Development and KinderUSA; in the UK, Interpal, 
Human Appeal International, Islamic Relief and the Pal-
estinian Solidarity Campaign; in the OPT, the Union of 
Good and the Palestinian Authority; in Canada, the Inter-
national Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy; in 
France, the Committee for Charity and Assistance to the 
Palestinians (CBST); in Italy, ABSPT; in the Netherlands, 
ORDAID, ICCO and Oxfam-Novib; in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark and Sweden, the Al-Aqsa Foundation; in Nor-
way, Muslim Aid and Islamic Forum of Europe; and in 
Australia, WorldVision and AusAID (Boon-Kuo et al. 
2015, 110). Although these investigations often fail to find 
any evidence of support for terrorist organisations, the 
allegations have an adverse and lasting impact on an 
organisation’s capacity to implement its programmes on 
the ground and raise funds internationally. As the 
Humanitarian Policy Group, a research and advocacy 
organisation funded by many of the world’s best known 
humanitarian actors, has observed, “once these kinds of 
harmful allegations emerge in the public sphere, some 
reputational harm to humanitarian actors seems inevita-
ble, regardless of whether the allegations are true… Repu-
tational harm may result in reduced donor confidence 
and loss of funding, as donors may be reticent to fund 
groups that may be engaged in allegedly negligent or 
criminal activity” (Burniske/Modirzadeh/Lewis 2014, 11).
The risks that relief and development organisations 
face often require them to seek legal advice and be ready 
to handle accusations of violations of counterterrorism 
laws. According to the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s 
‘Drivers of de-risking’ report, “Charities have also 
encountered specific direct costs of obtaining legal opin-
ions… One famous name charity required £40k of advice 
on sanctions regimes in order to maintain operations in a 
number of jurisdictions. It, like other charities, has had to 
invest donations in upskilling what used to be clerical 
level staff in its treasury department in order to deal with 
policy issues and complex requests” (Artingstall et al. 
2016, 60). As with the strictures imposed on the financial 
system by counterterrorism, the net effect may actually 
be less transparency and accountability if humanitarian 
organisations refrain from acknowledging their engage-
ment with proscribed groups (Metcalfe-Hough/Keatinge/
Pantuliano 2015, 9), or seek unorthodox solutions to the 
impasses they face (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 107-108 & 147 & 
148). In February 2015, 32 European relief agencies 
signed a joint statement on the “threat” posed to the 
global humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence. Calling on governments 
to “reaffirm and protect” people’s fundamental right to 
humanitarian aid, they stated that “growing numbers of 
counterterrorism laws and measures adopted by States 
and intergovernmental organisations are restricting 
humanitarian actor’s ability to develop partnerships, run 
projects in complex environments, and are delaying pro-
grams implementation” (Christian Aid 2015).
Giving evidence to the UK’s International Develop-
ment Select Committee in March 2016, two former inter-
national development secretaries, Andrew Mitchell and 
Clare Short, said Britain’s counterterrorism measures are 
making the delivery of aid in dangerous scenarios even 
more difficult, particularly for domestic and Islamic 
NGOs. Short suggested that the extra burden counterter-
rorism policies impose represents “something that’s gone 
deeply wrong and is very foolish and unfair” (Rumney 
2016). Mitchell said that Islamic organisations were 
“some of the few charities that can get into Syria and help 
the benighted people of that country, yet they are being 
held back” (Wintour 2016).
5.3  Counterterrorism and 
 peacebuilding
The impact of counterterrorism on humanitarian activi-
ties is particularly pronounced in the area of peacebuild-
ing. Some distinction between ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and 
‘conflict transformation’ approaches is helpful in under-
standing these impacts. The former is a state-centric pro-
cess involving ‘liberal intervention’ (including military 
intervention), state-building and economic development 
to resolve conflicts and bring about peace. The latter 
seeks to address the root causes of conflicts and aims to 
transform the structures, behaviours and attitudes of 
those involved. In practice, peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution usually takes on a hybridised form that draws 
on both approaches (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 48-49). Most 
important in the context of counterterrorism is the cen-
tral role that terrorist blacklisting plays in liberal peace-
building, which views criminalisation, disruption and 
isolation as the best way to bring non-state armed groups 
into a formal peace negotiation, with demilitarisation as a 
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prerequisite. Conflict transformation approaches, on the 
other hand, acknowledge that both state and non-state 
actors are accountable for their actions, that all social 
groups must be engaged in an inclusive process, and that 
such a process must include all parties to any given con-
flict (ibid., 46-47). As such, counterterrorism has had rela-
tively little direct impact on the professional negotiators, 
mediators and conflict resolution NGOs involved in for-
mal peace negotiations and the ‘quiet diplomacy’ used in 
advance of those negotiations. It is inconceivable that 
these actors, whose legitimacy is grounded in their rela-
tionship with the state actors involved in such negotia-
tions, would be prosecuted under counterterrorism or 
material support laws (ibid., 119-120). The same is not 
true of the broader peacebuilding community – the organ-
isations involved in funding and delivering projects aimed 
at conflict transformation – whose activities, such as 
human rights advocacy and support for marginalised 
groups, often lack legitimacy in the eyes of state parties. It 
is this wider group of humanitarian actors that finds itself 
constrained and vulnerable to counterterrorism laws con-
structed for the exact purpose of criminalising activities 
that could be seen as indirectly supporting the objectives 
of ‘terrorist’ entities.
Peacebuilders have contested the counterterrorism 
framework developed in the aftermath of 9/11 by mount-
ing legal challenges to the USA’s material support laws. 
But in a case brought by the Humanitarian Law Project, 
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the stat-
ute, and confirmed that NGOs providing training on 
humanitarian and international law, including how to 
petition bodies such as the UN, to groups designated as 
‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ by the State Department 
– in this case the Kurdish PKK and the Tamil LTTE – had 
provided ‘material support’ for terrorism (Center for Con-
stitutional Rights, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). 
Lest there be any doubt, the judge in the case stated that 
even if initiatives were intended to promote peace and 
compliance with human rights law, such assistance could 
still be ‘diverted’ to advance terrorist objectives. Irrespec-
tive of their nationality, individuals working for civil soci-
ety organisations anywhere in the world could now face 
prosecution in the USA and up to 15 years imprisonment 
for providing ‘material support’ to an entity they knew to 
be designated as a foreign terrorist organisation in the US 
(Emmerson 2015b, para. 36). More than any other, this 
judgment has had a chilling effect on peacebuilding, 
humanitarian and human rights organisations around 
the world (Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 
Program 2012, 18-21; Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 40-42; Boon- 
Kuo et al. 2015, 31-33).
It is important to stress that US-style material support 
provisions have been incorporated into a majority of 
counterterrorism statutes around the world. Offences 
including providing funds or property, which may include 
economic benefits or resources of any kind, offering 
advice and assistance, organising a meeting, or acting as 
a ‘go-between’, could ensnare peacebuilders acting at 
close proximity to designated terrorist organisations in 
numerous jurisdictions (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 28-34).
5.4  De-risking, self-censorship 
and securitisation
Just as banks are implementing risk-averse protocols, so 
too are donors, INGOs and philanthropists. This appears 
to be having a particularly pronounced impact on smaller 
civil society organisations doing politically sensitive work 
such as human rights and human security advocacy in 
and around conflict zones. While there is a lack of quanti-
tative data, exploratory studies suggest that the parame-
ters of humanitarian action have been shifted. Pro-
grammes that are specifically designed to avoid contact 
with, or provide support to, a designated group (so as to 
limit the organisation’s exposure to criminal liability) 
have come to take preference over programmes that are 
designed to respond directly and effectively to humanitar-
ian needs (Emmerson 2015b, para. 39). According to a 
report from the Humanitarian Policy Group, the fear of 
exposure to possible sanctions under counterterrorism 
measures has influenced “the programming priorities of 
many humanitarian organisations and made them reluc-
tant to share information on their activities” (Metcalfe- 
Hough/Keatinge/Pantuliano 2015, 9). This trend is accom-
panied by an increased reliance on the part of less ‘risky’ 
implementing partners, such as UN agencies and other 
international organisations, to the detriment of smaller or 
local NGOs (Mackintosh/Duplat 2013, 104). Exposure to 
counterterrorism measures is also seen to be contributing 
to a self-imposed restriction by civil society actors of their 
own space, with some NGOs preferring to reorient their 
operations to less risky areas. This self-censorship extends 
to the way in which INGOs communicate the work they 
are doing, or refrain from engaging in certain types of 
advocacy (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 116-119).
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A second response on the part of donors and INGOs 
is to introduce counterterrorism clauses, security proto-
cols and vetting procedures. The introduction of clauses 
demanding that NGOs actively exclude proscribed organ-
isations and actors from their programmes has led to some 
refusing grants, while the introduction of stringent vetting 
procedures (The Guardian 2013b), which often require the 
collection of large amounts of personal information from 
programme staff and beneficiaries, has increased mistrust 
of the INGO community among those they seek to assist 
(Boon-Kuo et al. 2015, 122). According to documents 
leaked by Edward Snowden and released in July 2014 by 
The Intercept, data supplied to US intelligence agencies 
during partner vetting by USAID has been used to expand 
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) 
database, which now holds records on more than one mil-
lion people, 95 per cent of them foreigners (Boon-Kuo et 
al. 2015, 42). These kinds of counterterrorism frameworks 
do not merely create an administrative burden for NGOs; 
they actively enrol them in intelligence-gathering pro-
cesses. Securitisation is also taking place within INGOs, 
who are instituting increasingly robust due diligence pro-
cedures including using companies like World-Check (see 
section 4.2) to screen staff, partners and beneficiaries 
against lists of proscribed individuals or entities.
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Conclusions: facing-up to the disabling 
environment
The FATF clearly has a legitimate role to play in combat-
ing money laundering and terrorist financing. Indeed, 
the urgent need for enhanced financial transparency was 
highlighted recently by the leak of the ‘Panama Papers’, 
which showed how easily proscribed individuals can cir-
cumvent international sanctions regimes using offshore 
schemes. The leak also highlighted the disproportionate 
approach taken to non-profits: those individuals and 
companies shown to be circumventing counterterrorism 
and political sanctions have not exploited NPOs but used 
accountants and tax-havens operating in plain sight of 
the authorities.
The repression of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ galva-
nised ‘pro-democracy’ governments in the West into a 
reaffirmation of their commitment to supporting civil 
society organisations working under repressive and 
authoritarian regimes. In the USA, the State Department 
launched a Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society in 2011, 
and two years later President Obama launched the 
#StandWithCivilSociety campaign, “a global call to action 
to support, defend, and sustain civil society amid a rising 
tide of restrictions on its operations globally” (The White 
House 2014). In Europe, the EU established the European 
Endowment for Democracy and committed to “a more 
strategic engagement with CSOs” that would include the 
mainstreaming of CSO dialogue across “all external 
instruments and programmes and in all areas of coopera-
tion” (EU Council 2012). The UN too has committed to an 
‘enabling environment for civil society’, one in which the 
activities of CSOs are facilitated by the legal and political 
climate. This is viewed as central to the realisation of its 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), even if attempts 
led by civil society to make the ‘enabling environment’ a 
goal in and of itself were rebuffed (UN OHCHR 2015).
Despite the recent amendments, the need for scru-
tiny of the FATF’s counterterrorism and non-profit 
rules – and the way in which they are applied by states in 
practice – remains paramount. This is essential if states 
are to meet their commitments to establishing an ‘ena-
bling environment’ for civil society and establish a 
coherent policy framework in which the new SDGs can 
be implemented. Whereas some governments are keen 
to talk-up the ‘enabling environment’, none are yet tak-
ing seriously enough the ‘disabling environment’ engen-
dered by counterterrorism regimes. Although by no 
means the only factor contributing to the closing of 
political space for civil society, it is the only factor in 
which inter national organisations like the FATF are so 
Counterterrorism measures directed against one group, religion or ethnicity have the potential to stigmatise whole communi-
ties, to fuel resentments and even to bolster support for terrorist movements. 
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clearly implicated, and hence, at least ostensibly, the 
easiest of those factors to ameliorate.
This report has examined the ways in which the FATF 
has impacted and continues to threaten the political space 
of civil society groups across the world. It has combined 
previous research with new insights in this area and syn-
thesised concerns expressed by INGOs, non-profits and 
civil society organisations with those of the UN’s human 
rights rapporteurs. Three particular findings stand out.
First, while it remains to be seen what impact the 
FATF’s new ‘risk-based approach’ to terrorist abuse of the 
NPO sector will have on the application of Recommen-
dation 8 and the evaluation of states’ compliance with 
the standard, continued vigilance and critical engage-
ment of its implementation is essential. Factoring ‘civil 
society space’ into the evaluation process may provide a 
degree of delegitimisation of such laws after the fact, but 
may not substitute for reform or repeal of the core 
assumptions and proscriptions that remain at the heart 
of Recommendation 8 – i.e. that certain NPOs are by 
default ‘suspicious’ and that regulation of the sector is the 
key to reducing the threat they pose. Aspirational com-
mitments to freedom of association and expression and 
the importance of preserving the ‘legitimate’ activities of 
non-profits will not be sufficient to prevent further abuse 
of Recommendation 8 by states using counterterrorism 
as a pretext for enacting repressive legislation. Moreover, 
there is a danger that this kind of conceptualisation 
serves to safeguard larger, more established non-profits 
at the expenses of smaller CSOs and activist groups.
Second, whereas the FATF has stated that, “as a mat-
ter of principle”, complying with its recommendations 
“should not contravene a country’s obligations under 
international human rights law”, it is clear that the FATF 
itself is at times directly responsible for pushing through 
problematic legislation that violates fundamental legal 
norms by threating legislators with sanctions. If interna-
tional human rights law is to be respected (and of course 
the FATF and its members have an absolute and une-
quivocal responsibility to do so) then concern for the 
adverse impacts of national legislation that has been 
adopted to implement FATF standards must extend from 
Recommendation 8 to other key counterterrorism recom-
mendations. Given the wide extent of national legislation 
required by the FATF to comply with its standards – cov-
ering policing, criminal law, surveillance regimes, execu-
tive powers and administrative measures, including stat-
utes with broadly defined offences and low evidentiary 
thresholds – there is broad scope for states to adopt legis-
lation that may be used to silence dissent or otherwise 
restrict fundamental rights. Yet for all the powers granted 
to states, the protection of fundamental rights is only 
mentioned explicitly in two of the 40 FATF recommenda-
tions, and only then in a very limited context.
Third, it is clear that further research is needed into 
both the scope and impact of ‘de-risking’ and the finan-
cial exclusion of the non-profit sector. However, even 
were the scope of the problem to be clarified, the possible 
solutions discussed to date have mirrored the limited 
ambitions displayed in respect to the problems that have 
arisen with FATF Recommendation 8. The kind of lead-
ership that will ultimately be required to address prob-
lems of financial exclusion will also require a rights-based 
approach – one in which the onus will be on banks and 
regulators to provide financial services, and offer effec-




To civil society organisations
 • Document and share your experiences with respect to 
the impact of government regulations and counterter-
rorism policies on your work.
 • Join the Global FATF NPO platform (see over) to sup-
port demands for the reform of FATF counterterror-
ism recommendations that impact civil society.
To national/regional parliamentary assemblies
 • Conduct enquiries into the impact of the closing of 
civil society space, de-risking and the financial exclu-
sion of non-profits on domestic, foreign, and interna-
tional development policy objectives.
 • Scrutinise the activities and decisions of the FATF 
and ensure that your governments are accountable 
for the positions they take.
To national governments
 • Implement a rights-based approach to financial inclu-
sion by providing guidance to banks to prevent the 
de-risking of non-profits. Support those subject to the 
denial of financial services through effective remedies 
and assistance in finding alternative service providers.
 • Develop coherent positions on counterterrorism, fun-
damental rights, civil society space and international 
relief and development by engaging the ministries 
responsible. Ensure that they are not working at 
cross-purposes and are taking consistent positions 
across different intergovernmental fora.
To the FATF
 • Refrain from compelling states, upon threat of FATF 
sanctions such as grey/blacklisting, to adopt legisla-
tion that UN human rights bodies have deemed unac-
ceptable from a fundamental rights perspective.
 • Mainstream compliance with international human 
rights law and the development of an enabling envi-
ronment for civil society throughout the FATF recom-
mendations and Mutual Evaluation cycle.
 • Provide civil society organisations and the non-profit 
sector with equal treatment to other organised inter-
est groups by granting them formal FATF consulta-
tive status.
 • Recognise the impact that de-risking is having on non- 
profits, ‘suspect communities’ and underdeveloped 
countries and address these problems by reviewing 
the FATF’s due diligence requirements and issuing 
additional guidance as appropriate.
 • Enhance transparency with respect to the enforce-
ment of FATF standards by ensuring that all Action 
Plans agreed with national governments following 
FATF/regional FATF style-body evaluations are pub-
lished and made available to parliaments and civil 
society organisations.
 • Review the impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of 
terrorist blacklisting in the context of fundamental 
rights, the liability of relief and development organi-
sations, and the use of ‘off-shore’ accountants and tax 
havens to evade sanctions regimes.
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Annex
The Global Coalition of Nonprofits  
on the FATF
The Global NPO Coalition on FATF is a loose network of 
diverse nonprofit organisations that advocate for changes 
in FATF’s recommendations affecting NPOs, particu-
larly Recommendation 8, with the aim of eliminating the 
unintended consequences of FATF policies on civil soci-
ety. Since 2014, four organisations, Charity & Security 
Network, European Center for Not for Profit Law, Euro-
pean Foundation Center and Human Security Collective 
have developed strategies, facilitated and coordinated 
the Coalition. They are supported by a core group of 
NPOs representing a wide range of interests across coun-
tries and regions
The Coalition focuses on a risk-based approach to 
preventing terrorism financing and improvement in the 
quality and effectiveness of FATF mutual evaluations 
without disrupting legitimate NPO activities. The advo-
cacy agenda is driven by FATF’s policy changes that 
require swift action and engagement by NPOs. The Coa-
lition has established a constructive relationship with the 
FATF Secretariat, Policy Development Group and the 
Evaluation Group for exchange of ideas, enabling trans-
parent engagement.
Coalition achievements so far include:
 • Revision of Recommendation 8 and its Interpretive 
Note: the recent (June 2016) revision retracts the claim 
that the NPO sector is ‘particularly vulnerable’ to ter-
rorist abuse.
 • In-depth revision of the Best Practices Paper (June 
2015), a policy guidance document that countries use 
to help them implement the standards.
 • Formalisation of a risk-based approach, which means 
more proportionate and context-specific implementa-
tion of FATF standards.
 • Establishment of a regular engagement between the 
FATF Secretariat and NPOs, which allows for more 
effective NPO participation.
 • Awareness-raising and coalition-building at the global, 
regional and national level.
The Global NPO Coalition on FATF communicates via:
 • this dedicated online platform (www.fatfplatform.org)
 • twitter (@fatfplatform)
 • email (from npos@fatfplatform.org)
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